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This thesis analyzes a variety of aspects concerning arms control with a
reformed Soviet Union. Despite the growth of pluralism in the Soviet Union
arms control will remain an important policy goal of the United States.
Policy-makers need to be aware of both new problems and opportunities
which will be created as the Soviet Union transitions into a democracy.
This study postulates four possible outcomes of Soviet governmental
reform and then examines one in particular with respect to arms control with
the Soviets in the future. Besides postulating the end form of Soviet
government it looks at inter-democracy relationships with an eye on
illuminating the particular idiosyncrasies involved in them. In addition, it
analyzes the possibility of learning lessons from the interaction of previous
U.S. democracy to democracy. Specifically, the U.S.-Japanese relationship in
trade and security is utilized in this comparison.
Arms control will still be necessary even if the Soviets are successful in
the restructuring of their government. It may become more difficult rather
than easier to reach arms control agreements with the new Soviet Union. A
restructured Soviet Union must cause decision-makers to rethink their
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I. INTRODUCTION
Arms control with a democracy? Besides sounding unnecessary, pursuit
of this type of policy goal has never really confronted U.S. decision-makers.
However, it may become a vital policy option for the United States in the
near future. There is a distinct possibility that the Soviet Union's archaic and
unworkable system of communist government will evolve into a pluralistic
representative form of democratic government. Despite the growth of
pluralism in the Soviet Union, arms control will remain a desirable policy
option for U.S. national security decision-makers.
This thesis will argue that arms control is both desirable and necessary
with the Soviet Union even if it becomes a democracy. Additionally, it will
argue that because of that democratization, the negotiation and ratification of
arms control agreements have and will undergo fundamental changes that
will affect future U.S. policy-making. These changes will present U.S.
decision-makers with a variety of new opportunities and problems.
As odd as it may seem arms control with a democracy will become a
realistic and desirable aspect of foreign policy if reform in the Soviet Union
continues. Without some sort of codified arms control it is highly likely the
Soviet Union will continue to possess a large number of both nuclear and
conventional weapons and forces. This type of situation was not acceptable
during the cold war nor will it be acceptable in the post cold war era.
However, the new paradigm will feature the Soviet Union in a radically
altered political state.
This will be the situation confronting U.S. decision-makers as we
approach the 21st century. There are a multitude of questions that arise out of
this new paradigm. The answers to a number of these questions are obvious
and to others they are not. Some of these questions have been researched
extensively and others are just beginning to be explored. Whether or not they
have been previously explored or answered is not as important as is applying
them to the new paradigm.
A. IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL WITH THE NEW SOVIET
UNION
Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to the leadership of the Soviet Union
marked a true watershed in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. From his rise
to power in 1985 until the present day Gorbachev has made numerous
decisions which have changed the course of the Soviet nation. The Soviet
political, economic, and military landscapes are all undergoing fundamental
revolution. The very fabric of Soviet society has been profoundly affected by
each of these revolutions.
It is not known if any or all of these revolutions will be successful.
Regardless of whether or not they are successful, the Soviet Union remains
and will remain a major world power. The sheer presence of nuclear
weapons, in the quantity which they possess, makes them one. Since the
early days of the atomic age it has been within the United States' national
interest to seek forthright and peaceful relations with the Soviets. This will
remain a goal of U.S. national security policy well into the 21st century.
An integral part of U.S. national security policy has been the pursuit of
meaningful and mutually beneficial arms control. Attainment of agreements
in pursuit of arms control are a national security goal which has not always
been easy or fruitful. However, it is important to continue to work toward
realistic and functional arms control agreements.
Unlike our longtime allies of Great Britain and France, the Soviet Union
has maintained a military doctrine directed against us. This is the number
one reason arms control is and will remain an important U.S. national
security goal. This is a security argument that can stand on its own, but it may
not be recognized by all decision-makers. No one knows if there will be some
type of enduring security conflict between the U.S. and the Soviets. Arms
control with our cold war allies has not been necessary because there was no
enduring conflict and we were presented with a common enemy. That is not
to say that the western bloc of nations did not have their differences. It is just
that they never escalated into armed tensions.
There is a substantial amount of research which indicates democracies
do not come into armed conflict over areas where differences exist. I will
analyze this concept further in Chapter II. However, it is important to
remember that nowhere in other people's research or my own does anyone
say it is not possible for democracies to fight. There is nothing to prohibit
democracies from fighting one and another. In the past democracies usually
have joined sides against a common enemy. In the case of the new U.S.-
Soviet relationship there may be no common enemy. This is the second
major reason why arms control with the Soviets is still important.
The third reason why it is important to continue to pursue arms control
with the Soviet Union is that there is no guarantee that once they become a
democracy that they will stay one. There are other end forms of government
that could be arrived at by the Soviets. A hard swing to the right after an
experimentation with democracy can not be ruled out. For this reason it
behooves U.S. policy-makers to negotiate good arms control agreements now
while the climate of the relationship is one of cooperation.
Real arms control is a goal which can not be abandoned no matter what
form of governmental structure is eventually arrived at by the Soviets. The
U.S. approach to arms control in the future will be directly influenced by the
form and style of government that is adapted by the Soviet Union. This new
situation will present the United States with both problems and
opportunities. Whatever the outcome there exists a whole host of
fundamental questions which I believe must be answered in order for U.S.
policy-makers to make smart decisions with regards to arms control.
B. METHODOLOGY
In arguing that arms control with the Soviet Union is still important
this thesis will attempt to answer several theoretical and policy oriented
questions. In answering some of these questions I will utilize four types of
methodology. First, I will examine two important theoretical concepts. One
is the theory behind arms control and the other is an analysis of inter-
democracy relationships.
Secondly, this thesis will examine general treaty ratification process in an
international perspective. It will then review the treaty ratification processes
of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union, prior to the start of reform. These first
three items are the theoretical background I will draw upon to set the base of
my argument.
Third, it will outline Soviet governmental reform with an eye on what
the likely outcome of the transitional period will be. In doing so I will look at
alternative future scenarios with respect to Soviet governmental reform. In
the alternative futures section I will postulate four (4) possible outcomes of
the Soviet governmental reform and transition. Each of them is important
in their own right, but I am going to conduct a comparison and contrast with
one in particular.
Most importantly, this thesis will analyze the implications of change on
arms control by utilizing two types of comparison methodology. I will do this
by choosing my most probable case from the alternative futures chapter. It is
in this area where U.S. planners must be most aware of new problems and
opportunities that will result from a reformed Soviet Union.
It is in this portion of my thesis that inter-democracy relationships will
be examined. In doing so I will look at the domestic elements of a democracy
to democracy relationship. I will discern the unique aspects of relationship
between domestic elements and foreign policy in two ways. These domestic
elements could quite possibly change negotiating styles and block any future
agreements from coming to fruition. In turn I will analyze the arms control
aspects of this new scenario for U.S.-Soviet relations.
I will go about this by first, examining the U.S.-Japanese security and
trade relationship. It is here that I intend to argue that there are several
lessons which can be learned from inter-democracy relations. I believe these
lessons can be utilized in attempting to arrive at a negotiating strategy for
dealing with a reformed democratic based Soviet government. Secondly, I
will contrast the U.S. treaty ratification process to one which may be adopted
by the Soviet Union. This comparison may lead us to look anew at arms
control goals and negotiations and it will certainly change our approach to
arms control.
Lastly, it will explore why all of this is important as well as what type of
arms control policy the U.S. should pursue in the future. This introduction
has laid out the foundation of my thesis. The next chapter of theory will aid
the reader in understanding much of the background of this thesis.
II. THEORY OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTER-DEMOCRACY
RELATIONS
In this thesis there are two very fundamental concepts which must be
understood before discussing the nature of arms control with the new Soviet
Union. The first is the theory behind arms control, and the second deals with
the interrelationship of democracies. In order to fully assess the direction of
U.S. policy-making it is important that these two concepts are fully
understood by decision-makers. It is for this reason I have grouped these two
diverse subjects in the forward part of this analysis.
This chapter will specifically look at the theory behind arms control with
an eye on the future for U.S. policy-making. The generic term arms control
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. However, when future arms control
agreements are being negotiated and eventually ratified it is important to
comprehend the nuances involved in all the aspects of the arms control
process.
Secondly, this chapter will address the notion of democracy to democracy
relations. Whether or not democracies coexist in harmony is a major part of
the core of this thesis. A reformed Soviet Union is the key to new paradigm.
It will present U.S. policy-makers with a completely new variation of
democracy to democracy interaction. For this reason it is important to
understand the theory behind these types of relationships.
A. THEORY BEHIND ARMS CONTROL
In understanding arms control the first question that needs to be
addressed is— What is arms control?
"Arms control is essentially a means of supplementing unilateral
military strategy by some kind of collaboration with the countries that are
potential enemies. The aims of arms control and the aims of a national
military strategy should be substantially the same." 1
With this definition in mind the second question that needs to be
answered is— Into what aspect of a nation's national security policy does arms
control fit? That is to say— What can be derived from pursuing and attaining
arms control agreements? The answer to these questions can depend on what
level a nation views and analyzes arms control.
"On the one hand, arms control is a technical exercise, which can be
pursued unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally and is designed to fine-
tune the superpower nuclear balance so as to preserve deterrence and
peace by eliminating incentives for one side to attack the other. On the
other hand, arms control is a political exercise designed to demonstrate
the desire of governments to reduce the scale and dangers of the nuclear
confrontation by pursuing negotiated constraints and reductions in
nuclear weapon systems." 2
The political aspect of arms control raises yet another definitional
question. Is there a distinction between "constraints" and "reductions"? The
answer to this question can be found by recognizing there is a difference
between disarmament and arms control.
"The crucial distinguishing feature separating arms control from
disarmament was that disarmament always involves arms reductions.
1 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control . (New York,
1961), 142, quoted in Michael Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice . (New
York: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988), 1.
2Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice . 147.
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These reductions might be total, involving the abolition of all arms; they
might mean the abolition of one type of weapon; they might be partial,
involving numerical reductions in some or all categories of weapons; or
they might be local, regional or global. Reduction, however, was the key.
Arms control in contrast may involve reductions, but need not
necessarily do so. Indeed, in certain circumstances the arms control
approach produces a requirement for more, not fewer, weapons. The
disarmament approach assumes that weapons are a cause of war, therefore
to abolish weapons is to abolish war. The arms control approach believes
that wars begin in the minds of men, that peace and stability are as much a
function of intentions as they are of military capabilities." 3
As one can see arms control is not synonymous with disarmament, but is can
include a measure of disarmament.
Furthermore, I would extend the definition of arms control much
beyond just nuclear weapons systems. It is true that the fear of nuclear
exchange and escalation are the most crucial of arms control purposes, but
other areas of weapons and forces can be controlled. The recently concluded
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is the most relevant example of
successful arms control outside the the nuclear specter.
It is also important to remember that arms control can fall into three
categories and be pursued three different ways. Arms control can fall into any
one of the following categories:
= Structural, actual constraint or reduction in numbers of weapons
systems or forces;
= Operational, restrictions on the operating methods and locations of
certain weapons systems or forces; and,
= Confidence and Security Building Measures(CSBM's), the exchanges of
information or data on weapons systems or forces.
3 lbid., 7.
While pursuing arms control nations attempt to maximize their security
situation by entering into arms control in one of the following manners:
= Unilateral reduction;
= Bilateral agreement; or,
= Multilateral agreement.
Each category and each method of pursuit has unique aspects. At one
time or another the U.S. has attempted one or more of them. The attainment
of future arms control with the Soviet Union may call into play any one or
more of the categories or methods.
B. DEMOCRATIC COEXISTENCE
The possibility is emerging that the Soviets at some point will develop a
form of democratically based government. Of course there are other
possibilities which can not be discounted. For the main thrust of this thesis I
will assume the Soviets will evolve into a democratically based form of
government. If that evolution occurs, it will present U.S. decision-makers
with some very interesting questions.
We may find it is difficult to interact with another democratic system of
government that contains the inherent problems of a democracy. I am not
implying that democracy is a bad form of government, but rather that there
are idiosyncrasies of and in the democratic process that make international
negotiations difficult in both the international arena and on the domestic
front. This thesis will tie together both of these negotiating fronts in the arms
10
control arena in an attempt at answering the basic questions of the evolving
U.S. -Soviet relationship.
Do countries with democratically based governments always coexist and
interact harmoniously? If they do, is arms control necessary with a
democracy and especially with the new Soviet Union? If they do not, can we
draw lessons from other types of inter-democracy dealings? Do democracies
reach solid internal consensus positions to present to other nations? What
are the trade-offs domestically, and do they affect the international bargaining
stance? Is it important to perceive and react to all of these questions? How do
we deal and interact with a nation that possesses the qualities of being a
fledgling democracy and the capability to destroy us?
In answering these questions it becomes necessary to look at a much
deeper one first. This deeper question involves the relationship between
democracies. As I stated earlier, this thesis will attempt to analyze this issue
specifically in the arms control arena. Before the Soviet Union started down
the path of reform it was not vital to explore this subject. For all that was said
about the Cold War one aspect was a truism. It was relatively easy to define
and negotiate conflictual areas. Arms control became a natural by-product of
superpower interaction.
Arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the past have been
undertaken because the basic conditions of a negotiation were in place. Fred
Ikle' states that negotiation occurs when there exists certain elements.
"...two elements must normally be present for negotiation to take
place: there must be both common interests and issues of conflict.
1 1
Without common interest there is nothing to negotiate for, without
conflict nothing to negotiate about." 4
Ikle' goes on to define negotiation by writing "...negotiation is a process
in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of
reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common
interest where conflicting interests are present."5
With this in mind it is not evident that arms control will continue to be
a natural by-product of superpower interaction. There will certainly be
"common interest" in reducing certain types of weapons through arms
control. However, the end of the cold war has brought about a significant
reduction in tension between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Ikle's element of
conflict appears to be lacking in democracy to democracy relations. Or is it?
The U.S. has never before faced a nation that has both the capability to be
its major adversary and has a pluralistic form of government. Bearing this in
mind it is necessary to lay the proper groundwork before I fully examine
Soviet governmental reform and what it means for U.S. planners. In my
view there are two elements which are essential to understand before
proceeding farther. First it is important to understand what is meant by a
"democratic" or "pluralistic" based form of government. Understanding this
concept is vital to recognizing and comprehending the inherent
idiosyncrasies involved in the operation of this form of government.
In political philosophy terms a democracy is described in the following
manner:




"'Democracy' is difficult to define, not only because if is vague, like so
many political terms, but more importantly, because what one person
would regard as a paradigm case another would deny was a democracy at
all. ...However, there is still this much agreement: democracy consists in
'government by the people' or 'popular self-government.' As such, it
would still be universally distinguished from, say, a despotism that made
no pretense of popular participation-the despotism of Genghis Khan or of
Louis XIV, for instance-or from a theocracy, like the Vatican. There
remains plenty of room for disagreement, however, about the conditions
under which the people can properly be said to rule itself." 6
In purest form a democracy is a government of self-rule where everyone has
an equal say in decision-making. However, in today's world that type of
democracy is unworkable. The concept of representative democracy is the
one most Americans are familiar with. It is characterized as follows:
"Obviously, the conditions of face-to-face democracy, with direct
participation, cannot be fulfilled within the political structure of modern
states, both because of the size of their populations and because of the
specialized knowledge needed to govern them. So although everyone
may agree on what makes a small group democratic, when it comes to
applying the concept to mass organizations, there is plenty of room for
different interpretations of the principles to be applied and of the way to
realize them under these very different conditions. Democracy now
becomes representative government, that is, government by persons
whom the people elect and thereby authorize to govern them." 7
Within representative democracy lies the notion of "political
representation." "Political representation" is where both the strengths and
weakness of this form of government are observed.
6 Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Vol. 2 (New York: The Macmillan
Company & The Free Press, 1967), 338.
7 lbid., 339.
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"Political representation" is the amorphous description of how a
democracy actually functions in reality. The manner in which a
representative modern day democracy works is described as follows:
"...the representation of interests; a democratic representative is usually
thought to have the duty to watch over either the interests of his
constituents or, as a member of an assembly representing the whole
people, the interests of the people at large. Nevertheless, he could still
represent the interests of a group of people without their having had any
part in choosing him."8
This is how the United States government works, and it may also
become the method of operation the Soviet Union will adapt upon
completion of governmental reform. I will further examine "the
representation of interests" in arms control in Chapter V.
The second element that is essential to explore is the theory that
democratic or "liberal" states do not come into conflict with each other. First
it is important to briefly discuss what causes nations to arrive at crossroads
which result in conflict. Thomas Hobbes attempted to explain the reasoning
behind such actions in his writing. His explanations have been expounded
upon by many scholars, and all have formed the basis of much of modern
international theory.
"In international relations theory, three 'games' explain the fear that
Hobbes saw as a root of conflict in the state of war. First, even when states
share an interest in a common good that could be attained by cooperation,
the absence of a source of global law and order means that no one state can
count upon the cooperative behavior of the others. Each state therefore
has a rational incentive to defect from the cooperative enterprise even if
only to pursue a good whose value is less than the share that would have
been obtained from the successful accomplishment of the cooperative
enterprise (this is Rousseau's 'stag dilemma'). Second, even though each
8 lbid.
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state knows that security is relative to the armaments level of potential
adversaries and even though each state seeks to minimize its arms
expenditure, it also knows that, having no global guarantee of security,
being caught unarmed by a surprise attack is worse than bearing the costs
of armament. Each therefore arms; all are worse off (this is the 'security
dilemma/ a variant of the 'prisoner's dilemma). Third, heavily armed
states rely upon their prestige, their credibility, to deter states from testing
the true quality of their arms in battle, and credibility is measured by a
record of successes. Once a posture of confrontation is assumed, backing
down, although rational for both together is not rational (first best) for
either individually if there is some chance that the other will back down
first ( the game of 'chicken"). 9
Each of these concepts are fundamental in understanding the basis
behind the pursuit of international agreements, most specifically arms
control. Herein lies the question of whether or not these conditions still exist
when two democratic states are involved. Are good relations between
democratic nations a natural by-product of governmental structures built on
similar principles? Immanuel Kant described this phenomena in his Second
Definitive Article of the Eternal Peace. Kant wrote about the formation of a
"pacific union" in which liberal nations avoid enjoining in any conflict
especially armed conflict.
"Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves
by means of the 'pacific union' described in the Second Definitive Article
of the Eternal Peace. The pacific union is limited to 'a treaty of the nations
among themselves' which 'maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily
expands.'" 10
9Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 1 and Part 2,"
Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 218-219; Doyle interprets
and quotes from Thomas Hobbes' and Immanuel Kant's work throughout his analysis of
foreign affairs of countries with liberal forms of government.
10 lbid., 226.
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Nearly every scholar in this field agrees that democracies are no less
prone to become involved in conflict. The key appears to be finding reasons
why they do not clash with each other. 11 There could be two reasons why
democracies do not come into conflict with each other. The first partially
relates to Kant's idea of a "pacific union." It argues that "democratic political
systems are sufficiently rare in the international system that their probability
of going to war against each other should be low." 12 That is to say that the
"pacific union" is composed of such a small number of countries that they
usually band together vice fighting each other. The other is the notion that
democracies have been subject to the hegemony of the United States. This is
the idea of a pax Americana. 13
With the emergence of new democracies around the globe it could well
be that we are witnessing the fulfillment of Kant's articles of peace. The
transformation of Eastern Europe and the continuance of reform in the
Soviet Union are indeed steps in that direction. However, this increases the
number of democracies around the world and by doing so will the probability
of conflict between them rise.
Furthermore, what does the relative decline of the U.S. as a world power
mean for the liberal association of nations?
"...the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the
liberal world. This danger is not that today's liberal states will permit their
1
1
Doyle's article is geared toward this concept. Additionally the entire June 1991
Journal Of Conflict Resolution is dedicated to these propositions and is subtitled:
"Democracy and Foreign Policy: Community and Constraint."
12Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Systems
And Allaince Choices In The Twentieth Century," Journal Of Conflict Resolution . Vol. 35
No. 2, June 1991: 285-306.
13 lbid., 288.
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economic competition to spiral into war, but that the societies of the
liberal world will no longer be able to provide the mutual assistance they
might require to sustain liberal domestic orders in the face of mounting
economic crises.
These dangers come from two directions: military and economic.
....Economic instabilities could make this absence of a multilateral security
bond particularly dangerous by escalating differences into hostility. If
domestic economic collapses on the pattern of the global propagation of
depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the domestic political
foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if international economic rivalry
were to continue to increase, then consequent attempts to weaken
economic interdependence (establishing closed trade and currency blocs)
would break an important source of liberal accommodation. These
dangers would become more significant if independent and substantial
military forces were established. If liberal assumptions of the need to
cooperate and to accommodate disappear, countries might fall prey to a
corrosive rivalry that destroys the pacific union. 14
Should the Soviet Union make the full transition into a democracy this
situation could apply to the U.S.- Soviet relationship. Additionally it is
wrong to assume all problems between countries disappear when they
involve democracies. A case in point is our relationship with Japan. Both
countries appear to have mutual interests, yet there remains significant
tensions in the relationship. Despite the obvious differences a great deal can
be learned and derived from the U.S. -Japanese relationship. This
relationship may provide planners with a basis and set of examples from
inter-democracy negotiation. Quite possibly this analogous relationship of
the U.S. and Japan in trade and security areas can well be transferred to the
Soviet Union and the United States pursuit of future arms control
agreements. I will further explore this analogy in Chapter V.
In the era of U.S.-Soviet cooperation the questions may become— How
can we best hedge our bets against uncertainties; and, Which country can best
14 Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," 233.
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exploit the other sides political apparatus to their advantage? Greater
superpower cooperation must cause U.S. planners to reevaluate the nature
and style of negotiating in attaining meaningful arms control agreements.
There is no question that cooperation and avoidance of conflict are of greater
importance today than in Kant's time. The evidence for democratic
government cooperation is substantial, but this does not mean that conflict
will never occur. To draw that type of conclusion decision-makers would be
taking too great of a risk with U.S. national security policy. The most
important aspect of national security should be the pursuit of all means
possible of reducing tensions between the U.S. and any potential adversary.
In the future that could be the democratic government of the Soviet Union.
There is another aspect of international relations that also must be
remembered. This is the fact that there is no supranational body that
oversees sovereign nation to sovereign nation interplay. The international
system remains an anarchy. 15The United Nations is just now beginning to
fulfill its founders' hopes. However, this does not mean nations will always
abide by the U.N.'s rulings.
Since there is no overarching international body it is in our interest to
seek ways of ensuring we get along with all nations. It is also important to
remember "it takes two to tango." Conflict does not come about by one
nation's own doing.
"All wars arise from a relationship between two or more nations. An
international war involving one nations is inconceivable. To argue that
one nation alone wanted war and caused war is to assume that its enemy
had no alternative but to fight in self defence. But before the war the
15Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis . (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959,) 160.
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enemy possessed various alternatives. It could peacefully withdraw its
demands of offer concessions; it could enlist a powerful ally, though that
would also have involved concessions; or it could launch its own surprise
attack. If it rejected these alternatives, and found itself attacked, it could
still offer those concessions which it had failed to offer earlier.
Alternatively if could refuse to resist military invasion and surrender
peacefully-a policy adopted by many small nations and large tribes in the
last three centuries. If a nation rejected these alternatives, one can only
assume that it preferred war. Wars can only occur when two nations
decide that they can gain more by fighting than by negotiating. War can
only begin and can only continue with the consent of at least tow
nations. 16
Conflict is not inevitable between democracies, nor is it out of the
question. It is important for U.S. decision-makers to craft arms control policy
toward the new Soviet Union with these thoughts in mind.
This chapter has put forth the basic building blocks for this thesis to
address both the opportunities and problems brought about by the emerging
new government in the Soviet Union. Democratic based governments have
a multitude of complexities involved within them, and each is different in its
own way. The type and kind of arms control reached between two
democracies will indeed be unique. However, the path to the end agreements
could very well hold some interesting turns. And it is certain that arms
control between two democracies will add to the body of knowledge behind
many of these theoretical questions.
16Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes Of War . (New York: The Free Press, 1973,) 158-159.
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III. TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS
The theory behind arms control and whether or not democracies interact
peacefully are both important sections of this thesis. Equally important are
the mechanics of the treaty-making process. Before I analyze Soviet
governmental reform and its impact on arms control negotiations and
ratification it is necessary to comprehend some basic principles of
international law. It is also essential to understand the codified procedures
for treaties behind both the U.S. and Soviet system of government.
Consequently, this chapter will briefly explore some fundamental aspects
of accepted treaty-making in international law. In addition, it will review the
U.S. treaty ratification process and the Soviet Union's pre-reform process. All
of these are vitally important to understand due to the fundamental changes
which will occur in the Soviet process. Why? Because the Soviets may adopt
some style of treaty negotiation and ratification that closely resembles the
United States' methods.
A. TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaties are political decisions that involve legal consequences. In arms
control treaties go beyond just the legal ramifications and include a national
security dimension as well. In order to analyze the future of treaties
involving arms control, it is necessary to review both the U.S. and Soviet
treaty ratification process as stated in the existing Constitutions. Keep in
mind the U.S. method of treaty ratification is not undergoing any change.
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However, it is important to understand how it works because the new Soviet
method may evolve into a similar mode of adoption. This is where my
comparison methodology in Chapter V, will analyze future problems and
opportunities.
A general description of international law and treaties is helpful before I
outline the current U.S. and previous Soviet sequence of treaty ratification.
Treaties are complex intrinsically, and they are driven by a multitude of
political forces. One scholar writes:
"States make treaties about every conceivable topic. By and large, all
treaties, regardless of their subject-matter, are governed by the same rules,
and the law of treaties therefore tends to have a rather abstract and
technical character; it is a means to an end, not an end in itself." 17
One would think that due to the legalistic nature of treaties that there
would be international covenants or procedures established for treaty
making. This is not necessarily the case at all. It appears the first writings on
treaties in international law started with Hugo Grotius in the late 16th and
early 17th century. His books De Jure Praedae (On the Law of Prize and
Booty) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) form the
foundation of modern international law.
"Treaties and other forms of international agreements have been in
evidence throughout recorded history. In modern times, beginning with
the writings of Grotius, writers and statesmen have depended mostly on
rules of law governing contractual relations between private individuals
in developing the principles regulating contractual arrangements between
states. Only in the last few decades have serious attempts been begun to
17 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law . 6th ed., (London:
Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1987), 123.
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develop international codes governing treaties and other interstate
agreements." 18
It is hard to believe that treaties have been around for so long, and that
only recently have attempts been made to codify treaty-making. For our
purposes the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 is the accepted
document in international law. However, not all nations are signatories to
the convention. The United States is not, whereas the Soviet Union is. 19
This is an area which can and has led to disputes among nations.
The convention attempts to lay down in formal terms the process in
which international agreements are concluded.
"The treaty-making process generally involves four major stages,
several of which may, however, occur concurrently:
= Negotiation (including the drawing up and authentication of the text).
= Provisional acceptance of the text, normally through the affixing of the
signatures of the negotiators.
= Final acceptance of the treaty, normally through ratification.
= The entry into force of the treaty."20
Two of the stages of treaty-making which overlap are ratification and
entry into force. Because of their overlap confusion can and does occur
concerning when nations become bound by a treaty.
"The adoption of the text does not, by itself, create any obligations. A
treaty does not come into being until two or more states consent to be
bound by it, and the expression of such consent usually comes after the
adoption of the text and is an entirely separate process. ...Article 11 of the
Vienna Convention provides: 'The consent of a state to be bound by a
treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting
18Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations An Introduction to Public International Law .
4th ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 479.
19Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law . 123.
20von Glahn Law Among Nations . 484.
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a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other
means if so agreed.' The multiplicity of methods of expressing consent has
unfortunately introduced a good deal of confusion into the law.
Traditionally,signature and ratification are the most frequent means of
expressing consent. In some cases the diplomats negotiating the treaty are
authorized to bind their states by signing the treaty; in other cases their
authority is more limited, and the treaty does not become binding until it
is ratified (that is, approved) by the head of state. In some countries the
constitution requires the head of state to obtain the approval of the
legislature, or of part of the legislature before ratifying a treaty." 21
In the past both the U.S. and Soviet Union have been very explicit in the
text of their treaties as to when each is bound by the treaty. 22 I do not believe
this will be a problem area in the future, but it is something to remember
considering how the Soviets interpret international law.
Each stage of the treaty process has its own characteristics and pitfalls.
Entry into force becomes the end of earlier steps. For my purposes the
negotiation and ratification processes are the major stages in which U.S.
planners must be aware to changes in Soviet behavior. I will discuss more
about the negotiation nuances as well as the possible new Soviet ratification
procedure in Chapter V.
B. UNITED STATES
Article II, Section 2 of the constitution contains a simple, yet
controversial phrase. This clause delineates the process by which the United
States enters into treaties. It succinctly says:
21 Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law . 125.
22Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control And Disarmament Agreements:
Texts And Histories of The Negotiations . 1990 edition, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990);
This is a government publication of source documents which pertain to arms control. It
starts with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and continues through the present day.
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"He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur;..." 23
This is relatively simple clause, but one which has been open to
disputation and interpretation since its inception. In its most basic
application the President or his plenipotentiary negotiates a treaty with
another nation, and upon completion of the agreement submits it to the
Senate for consent. When the Senate fulfills the advice section of the clause
they often engage in written correspondence between themselves and the
executive branch. 24
Once discussions are completed between the executive and Senate, the
Senate votes on consent which requires a two-thirds majority for passage.
The Senate may have reservations to the treaty which they attach in the form
of amendments. These amendments can force the President to renegotiate
sections of a treaty. This is a problem which can become extremely complex
and lengthy if a multilateral treaty is involved. 25
Treaty ratification, in the United States political process, is a series of
trade-offs and consensus building by the President and Senate. The matter is
further complicated by immense pressure exerted on the Senate by public
opinion and interest groups. The main interest group in any U.S. arms
control treaty is the U.S. military. I will examine their role in the treaty
process in the discussion of the new Soviet model in Chapter V.
23Constitution . Article II, Section 2.
24Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern And
Process . 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 412-413.
25 lbid., 413-415.
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Most Presidents enjoy a high success rate in the ratification of the treaties
they have submitted to the Senate. Only eleven treaties were rejected
between the signing of the Constitution and 1976. 26 However, the potential
exists for the Senate to prohibit controversial treaties from being accepted. It
has often been said that is relatively easy to obtain a one-third-plus-one
minority to block a treaty. One scholar has observed that "the two-thirds rule
thus often operates more as a barrier to foreign policy change than as a
facilitator of it." 27
Another aspect of the U.S. process which is not codified into law is the
good cop versus bad cop routine. This is a situation where the administration
and Congress purposefully take opposite sides and threaten rejection of all or
part of a treaty in order to gain a concession from the other side. This is a
political tactic that works just as well as non-submission to the Senate and
rejection of ratification. Additionally, good cop /bad cop can be done
inadvertently as well as purposefully.
Another well debated and hotly contested subject is the power of the
Senate over treaty-making and the willingness of some members to use
controversial treaty subjects as conduits for political purposes.
"The Senate Foreign Relations Committee bears primary responsibility
for conducting the hearings and investigations on which senatorial advice
and consent are based. The Senate has broad responsibilities over other
foreign policy matters as well, including, for example, an initial approval
of presidentially appointed foreign policy officials. These functions
traditionally made the Foreign Committee the most prestigious of all






The most well known example of such a political move was done during
and after the Soviet American Trade treaty debate. Senator Henry Jackson of
Washington "insisted on an amendment making the most-favored-nation
clause conditional upon the Soviets permitting unrestricted emigration (of
Soviet Jews specifically.) 29 The Senate eventually ratified the treaty with
reservations. The President signed the bill with the reservations and the
Soviets stated "they would not accept its provisions and that the 1972 trade
agreement would not come into force."30
It is probably fair to say that there have been a number of treaties not put
before the Senate for fear of political backlash or non-ratification. It should be
noted that treaty non-ratification can have a great impact on the conduct of
foreign affairs. The most well known U.S. example of treaty rejection is the
Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The fear of non-ratification
as well as political maneuvering has held up the submission and ratification
of the CFE treaty. The basis of this hold-up has been the Soviet's liberal
reinterpretation of some sections of the treaty. Apparently the controversial
sections and Soviet compliance with them have been rectified. The current
administration is expected to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification in
the near future.31
Non-ratification of a treaty as well as the use of executive agreements are
subjects that will be discussed in Chapter V. Politics are never far out of the
picture or far behind any treaty ratification.
29Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics. 1920-
1982 . (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.) 122.
30 lbid., 123.
31 Thomas L. Friedman, "Allies and East Bloc Back Arms Accord," New York Times . 15
June 1991, sec. A, p.3.
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C. SOVIET UNION PREVIOUS TREATY RATIFICATION PROCESS
The Soviets are currently working on a new constitution to replace the
existing one which was adopted in 1977. The 1977 constitution contains
several passages dealing with treaties. Each passage is legalistic and technical
in nature, and is an attempt to codify international relations with socialist
and non-socialist states. Until such time as a new treaty is adopted by the
Soviet Union the 1977 constitution, with its modifications, is binding under
international law.
The Soviets recognize their responsibilities under international law and
pledge their adherence to international norms under Chapter 4 Article 29 of
their treaty. It states:
"Relations between the USSR and other states are shaped on the basis
of the observance of the principles of sovereign equality.. .of cooperation
between states; and of the conscientious fulfillment of obligations arising
from generally recognized principles and norms of international law and
from treaties concluded by the USSR."32
"...Treaties concluded by the USSR." causes one ask the question; what
position or who acts for the government in the capacity to legally enter
binding agreements such as treaties? Unlike the U.S. constitution there is
nothing in the Soviet constitution designating the position or person in
which that power is vested. It is apparent that the General Secretary of the
Communist Party has assumed such a role in the past.
32USSR Constitution of 1977 reprinted in F.J. M. Feldbrugge, ed. The Constitution Of
The USSR And The Union Republics: Analysis. Texts. Reports . (Germantown, Maryland:
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), 90-91.
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There are sections which describe in specific language how a treaty is
ratified and enforced. Chapter 15, Article 121 describes the duties of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Section 6 of that article states: "The
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: 6) ratifies and denounces
treaties to which the USSR is a party."33 In addition, Chapter 16 sets forth the
requirements of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers exercises
authority with respect to treaties under Article 131, clause 6 when it "takes
measures to ensure the fulfillment of treaties of the USSR; confirms and
denounces intergovernmental treaties." 34
An interesting twist to the Soviet constitution is the right of republics to
enter into treaties with "foreign states." Chapter 9, Article 80 describes this
authority by stating:
"A union republic has the right to enter into relations with foreign
states, to conclude treaties with them and to exchange diplomatic and
consular representatives, and to participate in the activities of
international organizations." 35
However, republics are limited in their power to exercise this function by
Chapter 8, Article 74. Article 74 is the clause which clearly distinguishes the
power of the union over the republics. It says "The laws of the USSR have
equal force within the territory of all the union republics. In the event of a







Republic Sovereignty and precedence of union law versus republic law
are two issues of conflict which confront the Soviet government currently.
Fourteen of the fifteen republics have passed declarations of sovereignty in a
direct rebuff of the national government's policies. In an effort to quell the
uprisings and hold the union together Gorbachev is pursuing a new union
treaty. He has met considerable opposition in his attempts to forge ahead
with a new form of federalism.37
There is a "chicken and egg" scenario involved in the pursuit of both a
new constitution and a new union treaty. Obviously the major question is
—
Which one has to or should come first? Both involve political reform, but
there is a much greater need for a union treaty in order to hold the country
together.
This is just one of the issues that Gorbachev has had to deal with the past
few years. The central government and the republics had essentially reached
an impasse until April of this year. In April Gorbachev sat down with the
leaders of nine union republics, including Boris Yeltsin, and signed a "joint"
statement "stressing the urgency of stabilizing the political and economic
situation in the country." 38 This group of leaders recognized the problem of
whether or not to complete a union treaty or constitution first. One of the
main points of the statement calls for the adoption of a new union treaty first
and then within six months of the union treaty's signing a new constitution
is to be implemented.39
37Stephan Kux, "Soviet Federalism," Problems of Communism . Vol XXXIX, March-April
1990: 1-20.
38Roman Solchanyk, "The Gorbachev-EI'tsin Pact and the New Union Treaty," Radio
Liberty: Report On The USSR . 10 May 1991: 1-3.
39 lbid., 4.
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Regardless of which comes first a revised constitution and a new
"federal" form of government will have a direct bearing on the final outcome
of the transition from party organs to government institutions. This in turn
will directly affect the treaty-making process. Gorbachev may be running out
of time in implementing either of these crucial reforms. The Soviet
population is anxious for solutions to their problems, and they are becoming
ever more restless.
In this chapter, I have outlined some important aspects of international
law in the treaty-making process and explained why they are important to
understand as a basis for treaties between the U.S. and Soviet Union. In
addition I examined the U.S. and previous Soviet treaty adoption processes
with an eye toward how the Soviets will probably change to become similar to
the U.S. Of course this is dependent on the outcome of the Soviet
governmental reform that taking place. In the next chapter I will speculate
on how I think this transformation and reform may turn out. In the
following chapter I will make an explicit comparison between the U.S. process
and the process I predict the Soviets will adopt.
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IV. SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITION
Before any speculation about the future Soviet treaty-making process can
be made it is essential to postulate some form of governmental structure for
the Soviet Union. This chapter will do just that by postulating four (4)
possible outcomes of governmental reform. As I stated earlier it is my
assumption the Soviets will end up with some form of pluralistic democracy.
It is not my intention to describe in detail the future of Soviet governmental
institutions; rather, it is part of my thesis that the Soviets will encounter
problems which are indicative of democratic institutions as they become
more open and democratic. More specifically, I am concerned about these
problems and how they affect the Soviet treaty making process. My primary
area of concern pertains to national security policy and planning, and how
changes in the Soviet treaty making process will influence the negotiation
and ratification of future arms control treaties.
A. THE ROAD TO REFORM
The road by which Gorbachev has chosen to reform the Soviet Union
has neither been easy nor been traveled without difficulties. In all likelihood
it is sure to become rougher in the future. His now familiar policies of
perestroika, glasnost, and "new thinking" have attempted to reform a union
on the brink of breakup. The driving force behind Gorbachev's pursuit of
these policies is the imminent economic collapse of the country. Should a
collapse of this magnitude occur it will lead to certain disintegration of the
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Soviet Union as we now know it. On the other end of the spectrum lies
virtual reintegration where a form of Stalinism would be revived.
The failure of the communist ideal, confirmed by the revolution of
Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, had long been sought after by the United
States and its western allies. A fundamental transformation of the Soviet
political landscape has implications not only for the Soviet people, but also
for U.S. decision-makers. The complexities and uncertainties of a Soviet
domestic polity, awakened by Gorbachev, will confront the newly emerging
Soviet governmental institutions.
Gorbachev's policies have shaken Soviet political organs at there very
foundations. Most of the policies inaugurated by Gorbachev have introduced
very fundamental alterations in Soviet policy formation. In many instances
Gorbachev has opened "pandora's box", and in my view it will be next to
impossible for him to retreat from the path of political reform. As of now it is
unclear what path he has chosen; and at this point it would be extremely
costly for him and the country, in both political capital and lives, to put the
"genie" back in the bottle. The return to an old style Soviet Union is only a
viable alternative if Gorbachev is removed from a position of power.
We are witnessing a remarkable event in the transformation of an
unworkable form of government. It is quite uncertain what type of
government will result during the transition phase and short term. I believe
the long term outcome will ultimately result in some form of pluralistic
democracy. However, this is not altogether certain. There are a wide variety
of derivations which could eventually be arrived at by the Soviet Union.
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Of course it is quite obvious that the Soviets are in a transition period
and that the final outcome has yet to be determined. However, this does not
mean U.S. policy-makers should stop anticipating and planning. There are a
multitude of possible outcomes, but it is my desire to postulate and outline
four (4) of the most likely end forms of Soviet government. In a later chapter
I will further explore one in particular and what it may mean for the treaty
ratification process.
Each of the four cases below has unique aspects with regard to future
arms control negotiations. I have chosen to arrange them in ascending order
of probability from least likely to most plausible. Of course this ranking is my
opinion and others may envision a different priority of likelihood. However,
it is relatively certain that there will be fundamental alterations in the present
situation in the Soviet Union.
B. CASE I (BREZHNEVISM REVISITED)
First, there exists the possibility that Gorbachev will be forced to appease
the moderate hard-liners and return to some modified form of totalitarian
government. I think this is the least likely of any scenario because it would be
a revisit to the most recent past. And virtually everyone in the Soviet Union
realizes and knows that did not work. However, the possibility does exist.
If a crackdown occurs and the Soviets return to stricter governmental
controls, the newly created government institutions will be adapted to fill the
roles of the old ones. I label this scenario as "Only the name has changed." In
this case, a body, with a charter similar to the Presidium established under the
1977 constitution, would be created to take the place of the Supreme Soviet.
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This type of government organ would in effect rubber stamp any treaties
entered into by the President.
The leaders of this type of government would most likely be moderate
conservatives. The policies of this type of government would be marked by a
sharp return to those similar to the late 1970's and early 1980's.
Although policies matter much more than personalities it is important
to realize who could be the leading figure in such a government. It would
probably be someone like Egor Ligachev. Ligachev is a conservative with
moderate views. An analysis of his style of leadership it beneficial in helping
to plan for working with this type of government. One scholar has described
Ligachev's position in the following manner:
"...somewhat paradoxically, that Ligachev supports the cornerstones of
perestroika—'reasonable' economic reform and new foreign policy
thinking—but objects to 'the political component of Mr. Gorbachev's
perestroika: glasnost' and democratisation, a reappraisal of the Stalinist
past and the outspoken criticism of the Soviet system in some Soviet news
media'." 40
Furthermore, Ligachev has never publicly spoken out against
perestroika.
"If Ligachev's political role can be assessed solely on the basis of his
writings and public utterances, all rumor and speculation aside, then his
views surely bespeak not conservatism but reformism
—
provided that
reform is snugly wedded to Marxist-Leninist fundamentals in their
broadest sense."4 *
All of this indicates that Ligachev would return some form of
Brezhnevism to governmental institutions and policy. If this is the case U.S.




policy-makers have twenty plus years of negotiating history to use as models
for decision-making.
C. CASE II (STALIN REVIVED)
As I stated earlier I think it is nearly impossible to step back from reform,
but if the Soviets do it could be catastrophic for the Soviet people and
superpower relations. In my view if conservatives gain the upper hand on
Gorbachev they will not stop at old-style Brezhnevism. Once in power the
conservatives will move quickly to avert the breakup of the union. There is
little doubt that the form of government and associated governmental and
party institutions utilized under Joseph Stalin will be resurrected. In addition
this is more likely than Brezhnevism because many people believe this is
what the Soviet people really desire.42 A return to hard core paternalism.
A move of this type would probably be led by someone in the Soyuz
faction. Soyuz (or Union) is a group of Soviet legislators who oppose
independence moves by secessionist republics. This does not make them
Stalinists, but they have exhibited Stalinist' tendencies at times. They formed
42This is a finding I arrived at after having reviewed a series of polls in the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). I analyzed all political polls taken in the Soviet
Union from January to June 1991 and found there are still about fifty percent of those
people polled who still believe communism to be a viable form of government. However,
there is a trend that indicates fewer people are advocating a return to "authoritarian
solutions." "Public Polled on Political Issues," FBIS . 10 January 1991, 25. "Social
Scientist Advocates 'Good Dictatorship'," FBIS. 25 January 1991 33; "Poll Shows Half
of Country Rejects Communism, " FBIS . 12 April 1991 37; "Poll Shows Communists'
Confidence Reviving," FBIS 19 April 1991 30; "Results of Poll on Obstacles to
Democratization," 21 May 1991 45; and "Poll Shows Fewer Favor Authoritarian
Solutions," FBIS . 24 May 1991, 35.
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as a group in 1990 and claim to have as members about one quarter to one
third of the 2,250 members of the Congress of People's Deputies.43
The Soyuz faction does have close links to the military and KGB. In
April of this year they held a conference in which they called for a national
state of emergency and Gorbachev's ouster as President. Colonel Viktor
Alksnis, a Soyuz leader, espoused the philosophy of Soyuz in a speech during
the conference. He stated:
"'When perestroika was declared in 1985, it was said we were in a pre-
crisis states. Now, after six years of perestroika, the country- once a great
power- is in a state of national catastrophe. Power is paralyzed now. The
present leaders are incapable of changing the situation. They are just
floating down stream. They don't control the situation. There is no way
out other than a state of emergency. ..We went over the edge in
condemning Stalin. I see how right Stalin was and realize he was really an
intelligent man.'"44
Not everyone in Soyuz is of the same ilk as Colonel Alksnis and it is
apparent that even they are having internal disagreements.45 This is a
troubling proposition for the Soviet people and international relations as a
whole. Recent easing of superpower tensions would certainly take dramatic
step backwards. Arms control would likely come to a screeching halt.
D. CASE III (MUDDLE ALONG)
The third possibility I would like to describe is sort of a catch all case. I
have labeled it the "muddle along" case. In this scenario no group is able to
43 Elizabeth Teague, "The Soyuz' Group, " Radio Liberty: Report On The USSR . 17 May
1991, 16-21.
44 Excerpts from Colonel Viktor Alksnis speech as quoted in news report. Fen Montaigne,
"Hard-line Soviets demand tough rule," San Jose Mercury News . 21 April 1991, sec. A,
p. 16.
45Teague, "The "Soyuz" Group, " 20.
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gain control. Neither the conservative nor the reformers can mount enough
support to implement their agendas. This case is similar to Case I, but leaning
more toward reform minded leaders.
In this instance governmental institutions are unlikely to break quickly
from the past, yet in order to maintain their power-base they must adopt
partial reforms. This is a very illegitimate type of government which is
extremely inefficient. The introductions of piecemeal reforms will do
nothing other than plunge the country farther into its ever deepening crisis.
Gorbachev is the most probable person to retain control of the
government. However, he may end up as a sacrificial lamb at the altar of the
increasingly frustrated Soviet people. At this point new leadership will arise
to the top. Depending upon who it is they will move backwards to the right
or forward in democratic reform. Either way this watershed will invoke rapid
movement of consolidation of power part of the new leadership. Full reform
would lead to a governmental structure similar to the model I will postulate
in Case IV.
E. CASE IV (FULL REFORM)
As I stated earlier it is hard to put the "genie back in the bottle";
therefore, the next governmental model I will outline is the most probable
final outcome of the reform which is being instituted. During the description
of my predicted Soviet political system it may be helpful to refer to the
Appendix A. This appendix is a set of schematic diagrams of the Soviet
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government prior to 1989 and in transition in 1989 and 1990 as well as the
most current revisions of 1991.46
One of the most significant steps of political reform was the creation of
the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) by the Supreme Soviet in December
1988. 47 Sensing the need for political reform Gorbachev began preparations
for the new legislative body by holding a quasi-election for two-thirds of the
seats in the body. The Congress held their first meeting in May 1989 and
began a "shift of the political center of gravity from party bodies to the State
legislature." 48 The initial proceedings of the Congress were televised and
allowed the Soviet people to see first hand their government at work. This
was completely new for them and they observed that "the proceedings of the
Congress were often hectic and confused- a symbol of the difficulty of finding
new ways of relating to one another in a freer society."49 For an initial view
of what the CPD looks like refer to Appendix B.50
One of the first items of business for the new Congress was to elect a
leader and a new Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev was elected the Chairman the
body (at that time technically the chairman of the Supreme Soviet), and about
one-fourth of the Deputies "were chosen as members of the new, more
46Appendix A is a set of diagrams which were originally provided by Captain Thomas
Ellsworth, Lecture NS 3950, NPGS, Monterey, California: 17 November 1990. I have
modified and changed them as changes have occurred in the government structure.
47Congress, House of Representatives, Committee On Armed Services, The New Soviet
Legislature: Committee On Defense And State Security . Committee Print, 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess., 11 April 1990, 1.
48 Lars T. Lih, "The Transition Era in Soviet Politics," Current History . October 1989:
333.
49 lbid., 334.
50Reproduced from HASC print., 3.
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independent Supreme Soviet." 51 In an effort to further strengthen his
Presidential power Gorbachev called for the establishment of a Presidential
Council. The Congress amended the constitution and set-up a Presidential
Council whose functions were "to devise ways to achieve the basic goals of
domestic and foreign policy" and "ensure the country's national security."52
This body essentially supplanted the Defense Council, The Politburo, and the
Secretariat of the Central Committee. It should be noted that the Presidential
Council filled only an advisory function and was later phased out in favor of
stronger policy-making reform. However, it is important to understand that
Gorbachev has continually strived for the right combination of governmental
institutions in an effort to improve the decision-making process.
The evolution of such efforts are critical steps in understanding the path
of reform. Gorbachev reenforced and strengthened the position of the
Council at the 28th party Congress. He effectively weakened the Politburo
and Central Committee to the point where he in essence "fenced off the
decision-making process from interference by the Party." 53 The Presidential
Council consisted of advisors with varied backgrounds, and includes some
members who are not members of the Communist party and others who are
no longer members of the Politburo or Central committee.54 It appears as
51 Lih, "The Transition Era in Soviet Politics," 334.
52Alexander Rahr, "From Politburo to Presidential Council," Radio Liberty: Report On
The USSR . 1 June 1990: 1-5. The end of this article contains a list of the members of
the Presidential Council.
53 Rahr, "From Politburo to Presidential Council.", 2.
54 Lars T. Lih, "Soviet Politics: Breakdown or Renewal?: Current History . October
1990: 309. Examples of these people included Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard
Shevardnadze who both left their Politburo positions on the belief that the Presidential
Council would give them a better and "more secure base of authority."
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though Gorbachev may have been modeling the Presidential Council after
the U.S. Cabinet.
The biggest step toward political reform took place in July 1990. The
foundation for this step was laid in February and March 1990. In February a
Central Committee plenum recommended that Article 6 of the Constitution
be abolished.55 This was followed in March by a Congress of People's Deputies
adoption in principle of such an abolition. 56 These initial moves all
culminated when Gorbachev told the 28th Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU):
"We believe that the [the party's] vanguard role cannot be imposed on
society; this role can only be earned through an active struggle for the
interests of the workers. ...The CPSU will carry out its policies and will
fight to preserve its mandate as a governing party within the framework
of the democratic process, and via elections to the legislative bodies in the
center and on the periphery. In this sense, the CPSU acts as a
parliamentary party."5 '
In December, 1990 the Congress of People's Deputies moved further
down the path of reform by instituting "the third major overhaul of the
55Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution ensured the CPSU a total grip on Soviet Society. It
states:
"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet
society and the nucleus of its political system and of [all] state and social organizations.
The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.
Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist Party determines the general
perspective of the development of society and the course of the domestic and foreign
policy of the USSR, directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and imparts a
planned and scientifically-sound character to their struggle for the victory of
communism.
All party organizations function within the framework of the Constitution of the
USSR."
56Vera Tolz, "The Emergence of a Multiparty System in the USSR," Radio Liberty:
Report On The USSR . 27 April 1990: 5-11.
57Giulietto Chiesa, "The 28th Congress of the CPSU," Problems of Communism . Vol
XXXIX, July-August 1990: 24-38.
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Soviet political system in two years." 58 In order to begin extricating
themselves from a stalemate in the executive branch the legislature set-up
four new institutions: the vice presidency, a revamped Council of the
Federation, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Security Council.
The vice presidency was created to "assist the president in the
performance of his duties as chairman of the Council of the Federation, The
Defense and Security Councils, and the Cabinet of Ministers."59 In addition,
the vice president carries out the president's duties if he is incapacitated, and
the vice president would take over as the head of state if the president dies.
Unlike the U.S. system the vice president would only serve as president until
such time as a new president is elected60
The Council of the Federation, originally created in March 1990, was
restructured to include the leaders of the autonomous republics as well as the
union republics. In an effort to stem the breakaway movement among the
republics Gorbachev agreed "to upgrade the Council of the Federation from a
consultative to a policy-making body." 61
"[It]. ..coordinates the activity of the supreme organs of state
management of the Union and the republics, monitors observance of the
Union treaty, determines measures to implement the Soviet states'
nationalities policy, ensures the republics' participation in the solution of
questions of all-Union significance, and adopts recommendations on the
solution of disputes and the settlement of conflict situations in interethnic
relations." 62
58Alexander Rahr, "Further Restructuring of the Soviet Political System," Radio




62 lbid.; Reprinted from Chapter 15/2, Article 127/8 of the amended USSR constitution.
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This broad charter draws into question how much of an impact will
individual republics have on foreign policy, and specifically the treaty-
making process. It appears it may not be much and that the upgrading of the
Council from a consultative body to a policy-making body is window dressing
for the republics. The change was meant to be a "recognition of the enhanced
role of the republics in a renewed federation."63 How much of an affect this
will have on foreign policy decisions remains a question.
The most important function of the council will be to hold together the
union. It is quite evident that Moscow is attempting almost any shift in
governmental structure to accomplish this goal. This will be most difficult
task. The council will play a big part in this by making and enforcing its own
decisions.
"...the purpose of the change was not so much to give the republican
leaders a role in decision-making at the center as to make them
responsible for implementing the decisions reached by the council, the
hope being that this would put an end to "the war of laws" and general
disregard for all-Union decrees. A new article added to the constitution
states that a member of Council of the Federation ensures the
implementation of council's decisions in the relevant republic and
monitors the execution of these decisions."64
Once again of particular importance will be how much influence or
interference this will cause with the legislature and executive in the foreign
policy arena. I will explore the treaty-making aspect of this more in Chapter
V.
Along with the new change to the Council of the Federation the new
Security Council replaced the now "defunct" Presidential Council and will
63Ann Sheehy, "Council of the Federation to Be Abolished?," Radio Liberty: Report On
The USSR . 21 June 1991, 1-4.
64 lbid., 2.
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serve as "a consultative organ under the president." 65 The Council will be
composed of nine members and "will operate along the lines of the U.S.
National Security Council." 66
"...is entrusted with elaborating recommendations on implementing
ail-Union policy in the sphere of the country's defense; maintaining its
reliable state, economic, and ecological security; eliminating the aftermath
of natural disasters and other emergency situations; and ensuring stability
and law and order in society." 67
In addition to the above duties the Security Council will supervise the
actions of the Defense Council. 68 It is not known if this is part of the military
reform initiatives or if it is another method in which the civilian sector of
government is asserting its control over the military.
The fourth organ created was the Cabinet of Ministers which replaced
the abolished Council of Ministers. The cabinet is to be responsible for many
vital all-Union functions. It will be comprised of the prime minister (at its
head), the deputies to the prime minister, and the USSR ministers.
Additionally, the heads of the republican and autonomous republican
governments may participate in Cabinet functions and each has the right to
vote on matters before the Cabinet. 69 There may be overlap here with the
Council of the Federation and I can foresee future problems with conflicts of
interest.
Mikhail Gorbachev is in the midst of dismantling 70 years of communist
rule in hopes of maintaining a union and reforming a government. The
65 lbid., 3.
66 lbid.




government structure is very much in a state of flux. It is difficult to make
analogies with previous government transformations of the Soviet Union or
any other country. The Soviets are searching for legitimization for a
government which has existed only through oppression and terror. They are
tearing down old party structures and replacing them with government
institutions in hopes of creating a better form of government.70
Of course no one knows what the eventual outcome of the Soviet
governmental reform will be. But, it is important to think in terms of
possibilities and what each may mean for U.S. policy-makers. The other
crucial issue, which I will address in the next chapter, is that there is really no
conceivable way the Soviet Union will remain a unitary actor in
international relations should it evolve into some form of a democracy. That
would only be possible if the Soviets chose to return to a style of government
similar to one of my first two cases.
This chapter has shown only four possibilities for reform in the Soviet
Union. They are not all inclusive, but do cover the spectrum of options.
However, Gorbachev's restructuring of government does lend itself to move
closer to full reform. In the rest of my analysis I will assume that this is the
path that the Soviet Union will choose. In the next chapter I will further
elaborate on my Case IV and what it could possibly mean for arms control
treaty negotiation and ratification.
70 Refer to Appendix A.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. PLANNING AND NEGOTIATIONS
In the previous chapter I postulated four possible outcomes for Soviet
governmental reform. This chapter will elaborate further on the Case IV
scenario government with specific emphasis on arms control treaty
negotiations and ratification of any subsequent treaties. In addition, it will
examine the U.S.-Japanese relationship in an effort to ascertain possible
lessons for interacting with a democracy.
However, first it is important to understand the basic relationship
between foreign and domestic policies and why democracies have unique
characteristics in this realm. This in turn will help lead to answers to my
questions concerning negotiations and agreements between democracies. It is
fair to say that most policy-makers have believed in the past that democracies
cooperate and get along even in areas where their interests may have
diverged.
"Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars
with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to
engage in war with one another. No one should argue that such wars are
impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there
exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal
states. ...Politically more significant, perhaps, is that, when states are forced
to decide, by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which side of a
world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side,
despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors
that affect their foreign policies."71
71 Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 213, 217.
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With the Soviet Union a democracy, the common enemy of western
democracies in the post World War II era, a common enemy would be
nonexistent. That is not to say another one would not manifest itself. But if
one does not arise from the international backdrop the tensions that exist
between democracies may come to the forefront of democracy to democracy
relations. I believe decision-makers are beginning to realize this may in fact
happen more often in the post cold war world.
A. NEGOTIATIONS ON TWO FRONTS
As I related in Chapter II democracies are systems of governments that
are difficult to define and categorize. Each can take on a different slant, but all
are filled with a variety of domestic sources which affect policy. These
variables can at times cause a democracy to send very mixed foreign policy
signals. This in turn may cause other nations to misinterpret or become
misled by unclear intentions. It is a truism in democracies that governments
are not unitary actors.
It is widely recognized by scholars now that foreign and domestic policy
is somehow inextricably intertwined. In recent work in this field Robert
Putnam identifies four schools of thought on the phenomena of "domestic-
international entanglement." 72 Those four schools are:
=linkage politics, (James Rosenau);
=regional integration, (Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas);
=bureaucratic politics, (Graham Allison); and,
72 Robert C. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,'
International Organization . Summer 1988: 427-460.
46
=structural / (Peter Katzenstein and Stephen Krasner.) 73
Putnam is aligned with the "structural" school and its "state strength"
concept. However, he sees shortcomings of this school and contends there
must be:
"A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign
policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social
classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and
even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and
institutional arrangements." 74
In doing so he says:
"...we need to move beyond the mere observation that domestic factors
influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond simple catalogs
of instances of such influence, to seek theories that integrate both spheres,
accounting for the areas of entanglement between them." 75
At present this type of analysis is more important then ever before. On
one hand it is deeply gratifying to U.S. policy-makers that the end of the cold
war vindicated American foreign policy. On the other hand the international
security environment is more diverse and complex. An appreciation of the
intermeshing of domestic and foreign policy is a must for policy-makers in
this new international paradigm.
No longer are U.S. leaders dealing with totalitarian governments who
seemingly speak with one voice. That is not to say that they did not have
disagreement and dissent before. Quite the contrary the disagreement was





negotiations those governments appeared to speak as unitary actors. Thus,
U.S. policy-makers were not as much concerned with the internal bargaining
of a nation. There is little doubt that this issue has to be at the forefront of the
list of concerns for U.S. negotiators in any further negotiation and
agreements.
It is Putnam's hypothesis that this phenomena can be analyzed by his
metaphor of "two-level games."
"The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be
conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither
of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as
their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign. ...The political
complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering. Any key
player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may
upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his
fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat. On
occasion, however, clever players will spot a move on one board that will
trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise
unattainable objectives." 76
U.S. decision-makers are fully aware of the game with two tables because
they have had to play it for many years. However, these same people
sometimes fail to recognize this condition exists for the people sitting across
from them at the international table. It is the heart of this thesis to apprise
decision-makers of the possibility of this phenomena happening in arms
control negotiations with the Soviet Union as its government evolves into
some form of pluralistic government.
76 lbid., 434.
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As I stated earlier I do not fully subscribe to the concept that democracies
do not fight. "Liberal states have not escaped from the Realists'
v
security
dilemma/ the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system
considered as a whole."77 Therefore, in my view arms control is still a
necessary national security objective. "Two-level" game theory will help
decision-makers understand the process of liberal democracies in foreign
affairs much better. With this in mind the question arises—Is there anything
that can be learned from prior dealings with another democracy?
B. ANALOGOUS NEGOTIATIONS
It is when governments are pluralistic and open that the conditions I
have described are most prevalent. There are several key elements which are
inherent in a pluralistic form of government each of which can be
responsible for difficulties on both sides. These political elements created by a
democracy to make it representative of the people also cause a great deal of
consternation in reaching an internal consensus to present at a international
negotiating table.
Every element of a democratic society has a role to play and each is
important in the functioning of society. Putnam was correct in his
description of "domestic determinants of foreign policy." Those
determinants are exactly the key elements I am not sure U.S. negotiators
recognize the other side as having. Perhaps there are areas where these
elements have been involved on the other side. It is my view that this has
happened in our relationship with Japan. The U.S.-Japanese relationship
77 Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 232.
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provides decision-makers with a history of analogous negotiations that can be
studied as a model for possible use with the new Soviet Union. The
interaction and end result of this model may provide policy-makers with new
and unique viewpoints of analyzing democracy to democracy relationships.
1. U.S.- Japan Case
The U.S. approach to future arms control negotiations with a new Soviet
system of government may be derived from our past and present trade and
security negotiations with Japan. Japan is an ally who is considered to have a
democratic system of government and is at odds with the U.S. over many
issues. Some people may argue that Japan does not possess a democratic
system of government. However, if one looks back at my definition of
democracy in Chapter II, Japan's system of government does conform within
that definition.
The examination of this relationship may shed light on how we can
make the most in confronting new problems and achieving success with new
opportunities in the case of arms control with the reformed Soviet
governmental structure. In many ways the government structure arrived at
by the Soviet Union may be very close to Japan's governmental make-up. It
is unlikely that the Soviets will become as liberal as the United States or Great
Britain. Yet, they as I have said they will undoubtedly liberalize a great deal
relative to where they have come from.
Political power in the Soviet Union has been vested in the party for so
long that it virtually has directed every aspect of life. In order to conduct such
a operation the party developed a huge bureaucracy that pervaded Soviet
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society. Democracies also utilize bureaucracies to manage government, but in
a different way than a totalitarian government. However, as the Soviet
Union continues to transition into a pluralistic form of government the
bureaucracy will be carried along in some aspect. The new form of Soviet
bureaucracy may be very similar to how some scholars describe the Japanese
system. The term "authoritarian bureaucratic state" aptly describes the
Japanese now and may describe the Soviet Union in the future. 78 Regardless
of who is in power in either country there will be a tremendous bureaucracy
to manage the every day affairs of a functioning liberal democracy.
Considering the U.S.-Japanese relationship as a democracy to democracy
one of the question that arises is— How has the United States dealt with this
type of relationship in the past? The answer to this question is not as obvious
as it might seem. What has often been called "The most important bilateral
relationship in the world today..." 79 is also undergoing change. The glue that
has held this relationship together has been weakened.
"...the bilateral relationship is becoming unstable because of the erosion
of the three premises on which it rested: the consensus on the common
threat of Soviet military power and Communist ideological appeal; the
implicit and accepted pecking order in which the United States was the
dominant player militarily, economically and politically and Japan the
junior partner; and the mutual respect and reasonable harmony between
the political elites of the two societies." 80
78Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma Of Japanese Power . (New York: Alfred A. Knopf;
198), 33. van Wolferen utilizes this term to point out that their is a great deal of power
vested in the bureaucracy in Japan. In this book he is trying to determine who in Japan
runs the country. In addition, he provides an excellent description of who the Japanese
are as a nation.
79Mike Mansfield, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies," Foreign Affairs . Spring
1989: 3-15.
80Michael Nacht, "The U.S. and Japan: Building a New Relationship," Current History .
April 1991: 149.
51
With the underpinnings of the relationship eroded away the weaknesses
that have been there have come and will continue to come to the surface.
Both the security and trade components of the relationship have flaws that
have and will continue to cause both sides to come to loggerheads over many
aspects. These two components of the relationship have been debated for
quite some time by both sides, but are now threatening to boil over at a much
faster rate.
A great deal of the friction in the U.S.-Japanese relationship stems from
the notion that Japan is a "free rider." This notion has been around since the
late 1960's and has become a major source of contention between the two
countries.
'The United States has tried to get Japan to contribute to the protection
of its own security since the end of the Occupation. However, the benefits
Washington perceived it was receiving enabled defense-related tensions to
be kept under control. But as Japan's economy prospered (partly at the
expense of the United States), the cost-benefit ratio became increasingly
suspect. The "free ride" argument, an accusation that Japan was not doing
its fair share, began to be heard more and more frequently in the United
States. Both Americans and Japanese recognized the problems the other
side was experiencing as a result of diverging interests, changing
circumstances, and a widening perceptual gap.
Some Japanese have recognized the merits of the free ride argument
almost as long as have many Americans. Until the late 1970's, however, it
was considered imprudent for a Japanese public figure to be forthright and
to suggest that Japan was getting an excellent deal; such talk was essentially
taboo. The inhibitions, many of which persist, fell slowly. Were it not for
repeated U.S. pressures, which cracked the facade, as well as some early
candid, if guarded, admissions by Japanese officials, the chances are that
those taboos would still exist. Typical of these officials was former Japan
Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Sakata Michita's statement in 1975
that 'security for Japan up to now has been like sunshine and water.
When there is plenty, people take it for granted.' Such circumspect
acknowledgement of the validity of the free ride argument opened the
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way for a continuing national debate in Japan beginning in the late 1970s,
the outcome of which is still unresolved."81
"Free ride" or not the U.S. and Japan have increasingly come to
differences on a number of issues. During the 1980's the economic aspect of
the relationship over took the security component as the most hotly
contested issue. The United States' huge trade imbalance with Japan caused a
series of negotiations and resulting agreements to occur.82 However, at first
both countries embarked upon "voluntary" and "unilateral" actions to avoid
serious confrontations.83
These self-help steps by both countries has done little to lesson the fervor
and pressure on each side. "Japan bashing" and "U.S. bashing" has resulted
from pressure groups in both countries. These attitudes worry leaders in each
country and close attention is paid to opinion polls that are conducted
periodically. Public sentiment in a July 1990 poll showed that each country
thought the other was its biggest competitor and threat, but is also indicated
that there was a general feeling of friendliness and recognition of mutual
interests. 84
81 Edward A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A New-Internationalist View .
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1985), 11-12.
82Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead .
(New York: Basic Books, 1988). This book, written by a former trade negotiator in the
Reagan administration, offers valuable insight about the dealings of some of the most
recent U.S.-Japan trade negotiations.
83Stephen D. Cohen, "United States-Japanese Trade Relations," Current History . April
1991: 152.
84Michael Oreskes, "Americans Voice Worry on Japan; Tokyo Softens," New York Times .
sec. A, p. 7. As a side-note this poll indicated a significant shift in American attitudes
about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's military power fell well behind Japan's
economic power as the number one perceived threat to America.
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It is quite clear public opinion pays a part in foreign policy. The Japanese
are not taking U.S. public opinion lightly. Tetsuya Tsudushi, a television
anchor in Tokyo, hinted at a "changing attitude" in Japan based on American
demands for "more open markets and internal reform of the Japanese
economy." 85 However, the Persian gulf crisis may have reversed some of the
good feelings acquired after the 1990 trade talks and concessions. Japan's
proportionally small participation in the allied coalition may have "deepened
the rift" between the U.S. and Japan even more.86
As with arms control there are other factors besides public opinion
involved in shaping trade policy. In the U.S. the Congress is pressured by a
variety of interest groups who see the Japanese as a threat. In addition these
groups are concerned about their own economic well-being and the trade
imbalance. Responding to the concerns of these interest groups Congress
passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988. 87 This law was
aimed at supporting U.S. businesses across the board with many nations, but
is was undoubtedly aimed at Japan.
The most controversial part of the new law was the modification to
provision 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. "Super 301", as it is called, is direct
Congressional pressure on the executive branch to impose deadlines on other
countries to correct "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable" barriers of American
imports. 88 Japan reacted strongly to this U.S. action, but avoided U.S.
85 lbid.
86Carla Rapport, "The Big Split," Fortune . 6 May 1991: 38.
87 I.M. Destler and Michael Nacht, "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.
Japan Relationship in the 1990's" International Security . Winter 1990/91: 92-119.
88 lbid., 105.
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retaliatory action by agreeing to a series of bilateral agreements, and enjoining
the U.S. in talks labeled the Structural Impediments Initiative.89
This all may seem fairly straight forward, but a deeper look reveals there
was much more involved on both sides. Besides public opinion, interest
groups, and Congress the U.S. position was influenced by a diverse group of
opinions in the administration. This statement may not be entirely accurate
in who has the correct national interest in mind, but it illustrates the
diversity in even one branch of government.
"The State Department, the National Security Council and parts of the
Defense Department tend to argue that commercial issues are secondary to
the larger goal of preserving the political and military alliance with Japan.
The Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Adviser, and the
Office Management and Budget view themselves as the defenders of the
free market and opponents of any official intervention to determine the
composition of trade flows. These two sets of forces are pitted against the
third bureaucratic version of what is truly in the United States national
interest-the trade hawks. The Office of the United States Trade
Representative, the Commerce Department, and those parts of the Defense
Department worried about increasing dependence of United States
weapons systems on Japanese electronics components view themselves as
the spokespeople in government for both a largely battered,
misunderstood American industrial sector and for a more decisive,
aggressive, and consistent trade policy (bilaterally and multilaterally)."90
In Japan it is really not that much different. As already mentioned
public pressure plays an important role. In addition to the formal organs of
power, the Diet (legislature) and ministries, the Japanese leaders must deal
with a multitude of interest groups both within and out of government. 91
89 lbid., and Cohen, "United States-Japanese Trade Relations," 154.
90Cohen, "United States-Japanese Trade Relations," 186.
91 Masao Sakurai, "Formulators And Legislators Of International Trade And Industrial
Policy in Japan And The United States," chapter in The U.S. Japanese Economic
Relationship: Can It Be Improved ?, ed. Kichiro Hayashi, (New York: New York
University Press, 1989): 160-193.
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One of the biggest is the keiretsu, or industrial group, composed of the leaders
of Japan's major industrial firms who meet on a regular basis to discuss trade
and industrial policy. 92
The agreements Japan made with the U.S. in 1990 to stem the imposition
of "Super 301" action stirred quite a few Japanese interest groups up. Small
businessmen, and consumers were all upset over the "concessions" Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu made. 93 Additionally, Japanese farmers remain upset
over possible concessions at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),94 and with U.S. pressure on Japan to open up its
lucrative rice market. 95 Furthermore, the Japanese administration has its
own internal differences on how to handle the trade issue. Prime Minister
Kaifu and his Cabinet Ministers, specifically the Minister of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) have been "split" over a number of aspects of the
Japanese bargaining position on trade. 96
For the most part Japanese policy-making appears to run "along the
classic lines of the bureaucratic politics model of decision making." 97 This is
both good to know and good to remember as we begin to plan for future arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union.
92 Rapport, "The Big Split," 46.
93
"Japanese Merchants, consumers decry trade concessions to U.S.," San Jose Mercury
News
.
7 April 1990, sec. A, p. 18.
94Sam Nakagama, "In Japan, Farm Supports Prop Up more Than Farms." New York
Times . 13 July 1990, sec. A, p.11.
95 Paul Blustein, "U.S. rice display in Tokyo has Japanese Boiling Mad," San Jose News .
16 March 1991, sec. F. p.9.
96 Lewis M. Simons, "Kaifu, Cabinet split on Trade," San Jose Mercury News . 2 April
1990, sec. A, p.1.
97Cohen, "United States-Japanese Trade Relation," 186.
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It is my hope that my brief description of the U.S.-Japanese relationship
will cause U.S. policy-makers to look at it for help in dealing with the new
pluralistic based Soviet governmental structure. Of course there is no specter
of an agreed upon enemy or "free rider" concept in the U.S.-Soviet case, but
never-the-less the fundamental aspects of democracy to democracy
negotiations will be applicable. That is to say what is most important is to
observe what affects what in this type of relationship. With this in mind I
will try to provide some insight into future arms control agreements with the
Soviet Union in my next section.
C CASE IV SOVIET GOVERNMENT
1. Probable Future Soviet Treaty Negotiation and Ratification Process
The process by which the Soviet Union negotiates, enters into, and
ratifies future treaties really depends on the type of government they end up
adopting. In Chapter IV I postulated four (4) possible forms of future Soviet
government. In this chapter I will assume Case IV (democratic pluralistic
based) is the most likely outcome of further government reform. Therefore, I
will analyze how this particular form of government may influence arms
control negotiations and agreements. Most specifically I will explore the
political intricacies involved in the treaty negotiation and ratification process.
In researching this section I interviewed three (3) Soviet scholars, one (1)
Soviet diplomat, and one (1) U.S. Soviet expert. In addition, I explored U.S.
literature on the arms control process with a specific eye on who and what
influences and shapes the process. Soviet literature is just now becoming
available and will prove to be valuable in the future.
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I think one could superimpose the U.S. system of government
(President,Congress, Cabinet Departments, States, MIC, Public, etc.) on
Appendix A and draw many comparisons. These comparisons will be helpful
in comprehending what I expect will be the future of Soviet treaty negotiation
and ratification. I will attempt to parallel my Soviet treaty-making
comparison along the lines of U.S. government institutions. This will assist
me in explaining the injection of treaty and arms control problems in a new
pluralistic Soviet government.
Of course no one really knows what the Soviet Union's final
government will look like or when it will be arrived at, but is is important to
have something to plan from. I have utilized a comparison methodology in
analyzing possible outcomes in hopes of stimulating thinking in this area.
However, I realize one must be many because mirror-imaging has
shortcomings. It is not my intent to draw straight comparisons. I am merely
using the comparisons to make U.S. planners aware of potential problems
and opportunities in future arms control agreements.
As with any set of international bargaining arms control involves a two-
front process.
"Modern international arms control is a process involving two sets of
parallel negotiations which are both crucial to the outcome of attempts by
states to enter into arms control security relationships. On the one hand,
there are the bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the states
themselves,such as the SALT talks or the negotiations for the NPT. On
the other hand, there is the debate and bargaining within states both as to
the negotiating strategy and tactics to be employed at the international
talks and that relating to the domestic wheeling and dealing which is
required in order to produce a majority behind the eventual agreement. It
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is not always obvious that the international aspect is the more important
of the two." 98
Just as in trade, this two front process can be convoluted and complex. In
the Soviet Union's case there could be nothing closer to the truth. As I
pointed out in Chapter IV the evolution of the government is nowhere near
complete or without its share of difficulties. One of the main problems is
finding the right way to break with the past.
It is hard to replace 70 plus years of communism without experiencing
resistance from those who wish to maintain the old system. Many of
Gorbachev's problems stem from the fact that at times he has dismantled the
old structure without replacing it with anything new to do its critical
functions." As one can observe by reviewing Appendix A Gorbachev is
attempting to replace outmoded party structure with new governmental
structure.
As I stated in Chapter IV the Congress of People's Deputies was formed
in 1988 as one of the first new governmental structures. As a legislative body
it is just beginning to find its role in the new system of government. Their
biggest problem in the arms control and treaty areas is their lack of expertise
and experience. 100 Presently most of the expertise and power for treaty
ratification lies in the hands of the Supreme Soviet (Standing Body, Upper
Chamber of Parliament). 101 However, there is a push by the Congress of
98Sheehan, Arms Control . 83.
"Ellsworth.
1 00Vladislav Zubok, "USSR Ratification Process," Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies,
unpublished paper presented at Stanford University 9 December 1990.
101 Arseny Berezin, Interview by Lt. Randall Hendrickson, 14 December 1990.
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Peoples' Deputies to have all treaties approved by them. 102 This has not
happened yet. Most recently the Supreme Soviet exercised its power when it
ratified the German reunification treaty. 103
There are 2250 members of the Soviet Congress compared to 100
members of the U.S. Senate. This fact alone may multiply the problems of
treaty ratification. However, the Soviets are aware of this potential problem
and are forming committees the Supreme Soviet which has only 542
member. These committees have been formed to deal with the intricacies of
foreign policy of which a subset is arms control treaties. The committees
which have been setup have responsibilities in a wide variety of arenas. The
Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have set up several
joint committees which are associated with arms control and defense. They
include: Committee for Defense and State Security (DSSC) (dominated by the
military), Committee for International Affairs, and Committee for Veteran
and Invalid affairs. 104 Additionally the Council of the Union has Planning,
Budget and Finance commissions which will undoubtedly become involved
and in the defense arena. 105
Appendix B is an outline of the Soviet legislature and it Committee
make-up. 106 In addition, I am not sure the final grouping of these committees
has been determined and there may well be more committees established to
1 °2| b id.
103
"Soviets Ratify Pact on German Reunification," Los Angeles Times . 5 March 1991,
sec. A, p. 4.
104HASC print; and Stephen Foye, "U.S. Congressional Report on Soviet Committee for
Defense and States Security," Radio Liberty: Report On The USSR . 11 May 1990, 6-8.
105HASC PRINT.
106 Reproduced from the HASC Committee print,3.
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deal with emerging issues. It is known that the DSSC is composed of 43
members and is modeled after the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. 107
But it is not much like the HASC yet.
"Matters pertaining to defense and state security have always been
shrouded in secrecy in the Soviet Union, without even a pretense of
public participation. The old USSR Supreme Soviet did not have a
commission for defense or state security. ...There is an extreme bias not
only towards the military-industrial-Party-security complex but also
against the Union republics."108
This one-sided composition of the DSSC has come about due to a lack of
expertise by members of the Soviet Congress. They have been forced to look
for outside sources of information and advice. In doing so some of the
members and staff have turned to the military for consultations. 109 I have
discovered little is known about how the Soviet military approached
ratification of arms control treaties in the past. During the negotiations and
eventual ratification of SALT I there was a brief glimpse of Soviet political-
military relations. It is not clear how the Soviet military affected the outcome
of the treaty, but there has been some analysis of their probable role. 110
However, it is particularly significant that military members are allowed to be
elected as members of the legislature. This may double the complexities of
the military as a special interest group with a voice on arms control
107 lbid., 4.
1 08 Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR
Supreme Soviet," Radio Liberty: The Report On The USSR . 11 May 1990: 8-11.
109Zubok.
110Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and SALT," chap, in Soviet Decision
making for National Security . Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds. (Boston: George
Allen & Unwin, 1984): 136-161.
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negotiation and treaty-making. Additionally, it is unlikely that the military
will be restricted from legislative membership in the near future. 111
From a U.S. perspective SALT I brought about a domestic debate that
provides us with an insight into what it takes to obtain military support for
an arms control treaty. JCS support for SALT I hinged on the approval of
Congress (U.S.) of accelerated B-l bomber and Trident programs. 112 There is
little doubt the Soviet military will make their influence felt by adopting a
similar sort of barter attitude. This will be an important factor as the military
is scaled down and reformed in the Soviet Union.
At the same time the Congress is looking to the military for help, the
Soviet executive branch is asserting measures aimed at drastic military
reform. Gorbachev is supporting a reform package aimed at restructuring the
Soviet military from top to bottom. He is striving for complete civilian
control over the military. This could mean no more military members of
Congress, and that the military would serve the executive and legislative
branches in "only a consulting role." 113
111 Yuri V. Urbanovich, Interview by Lt. Randall Hendrickson, 3 April 1991.
112Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Lulling and Stimulating Effects Of Arms Control," chap, in
Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight . Albert Carnesale and Richard N.
Haass, eds. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), 251 -
252.
113Berezin. In order to fully understand the motives behind the reform of the military I
think it is necessary to analyze Gorbachev's policies regarding "New Thinking". The
following two articles provide excellent descriptions and analysis of the Soviet policy.
Seweryn Bialer, "'New Thinking' and Soviet foreign policy," Survival . Vol. XXX, No. 4
July/August 1988: 281-309; and Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet
Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly . Summer 1988: 131-158.
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If this reform is successful we may see a solidification of the Soviet
version of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). 114 Among hard-liners and
certain military leaders there is a deep desire to fight for their status in society,
as well as to push for the continuance of some weapons programs. This quite
possibly could include industries and weapons programs that will help
ensure the "old guard" will maintain positions of power.
As I indicated in Chapter IV Gorbachev's biggest challenge from the right
continues to come from the military dominated Soyuz faction. Soyuz has
been joined in their efforts by the KGB and the police. 115 Additionally,
considering the make-up of the DSSC, "it is not surprising that the
Committee for Defense and State Security has been reluctant to tackle reform
of the major national security institutions—the armed forces, the defense
industry, and the KGB." 116 It is my contention that the farther the military
feels alienated from decision-making the more they will take the trade-off
approach in the arms control arena much like the U.S. military. This method
of lobbying will facilitate them in maintaining some of their programs and
policies over the insistence to cut them by others.
But on both sides of the ocean the end of the cold war has brought two
other factors into play in this trade-off game. In the U.S. the decline of the
Soviet Union as a threat has raised the call from many corners to scale back
114Zubok; Urbanovich; and John Tedstrom, "Managing the Conversion of the Defense
Industries," Radio Liberty: The Report On The USSR . 16 February 1990: 11-18. As
with the U.S. there is no clear cut definition of the Ministries, Industries, or groups who
make-up the MIC.
115Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Hard-Liners Keep Up the Attack," New York Times . 25
June 1991, sec. A, p. 6.
116Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme
Soviet," 10.
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the military unilaterally. This has caused some alarm in the military and
those proponents of a strong military. What does this mean for the Soviet
military's use of the U.S. threat as a force justifier?
Those outside the Military, KGB, and the Ministry of Defense quite
possibly see the decline of the U.S. as a threat as a way to make their positions
better known. If these voices begin to be heard then the military may not
have as strong of a role to play in the decision-making of defense spending.
The cut backs of programs such as the B-2 in the U.S. could add to this trend.
Some sectors of the Soviet political process could observe our Congress
cutting back our defense and they in turn could push for a similar Soviet
unilateral reduction. This action-reaction phenomena could cause a snowball
effect that could start a build-down on both sides with little input from either
military.
Secondly, both countries are grappling with huge budget deficits. The
urge to save money may cause both legislatures to slash defense expenditures.
Although it is less likely to happen in the Soviet Union as long as the
military are allowed to remain members of the legislature and the military at
the same time. Even though they are a minority in the legislature they do
wield considerable power and have several staunch allies in other members.
This unique situation will aid them in maintaining an influence in military
and budgetary affairs for some time to come.
In an effort to exert more control over the Ministry of Defense and the
military the Congress has begun to attempt, with the Financial Planning
committee, to control defense expenditures. Fortunately for the Soviet
military the legislature does not yet comprehend the "power of the purse."
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However, the Congress now requires the Ministry of Defense to make yearly
reports to it, and to submit the military's request for a budget. Last year
Congress gave the Ministry a list of 20 questions concerning military affairs.
The Ministry and the military ignored them, but this year the Congress is
pushing hard in an attempt not to allow that to happen again. 117
In addition to looking to the military for expertise, some members of the
legislature are turning to academics and scientists. This is very similar to
what the U.S. Congress did during the ABM debate. Both groups have their
own policy preferences and are making their voices heard. 118 Some Soviets
believe that these groups have little say and their voice will not substantially
increase in the future. 119 I strongly disagree with that premise. The freer a
society becomes the more those types of voices will be heard.
The "Green" movement is another group wishing to have their
concerns heard. They are a "noisy minority" whose support is at the grass
roots level. 120 This movement is pushing for nuclear free zones, and has
successfully lobbied the Kazakh Supreme Soviet to impose a moratorium on
nuclear testing in Khazakistan. 121 This moratorium was suppose to take
effect in 1990. In addition, this group is concerned about pollution that has
come from years of military production, and future pollution which is bound
117 lbid.
118Zubok, Berezin, and Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," 148.
119 Urbanovich.
120Berezin and Zubok.
121 D.J. Peterson, "The Impact of the Environmental Movement on the Soviet Military,"
Radio Liberty: The Report On The USSR . 15 March 1991: 5-9; This halt in testing has
implications that go beyond arms control and strike at the heart of nuclear stockpile
safety.
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to occur from weapons destruction as the Soviets comply with previously
signed treaties such as INF and CFE. 122
The ecological movement is also split along nationalism lines. These
groups are pushing for more control over ecological problems in the republics
and in doing so they are aligned against the center in both a nationalistic way
and an anti-military way. However, they are caught between the economic
pressures from the central government and the desire to improve their
surroundings.
"However,committed to the environmental protection the new,
democratically elected governments may be, they nevertheless face limits.
First, the transition to an efficient and environmentally clean economy is
slow and painful, cost jobs and tremendous resources, and thus requires
that improved living standards be further postponed. Second, devolution
of authority does not guarantee that sound environmental policies will
follow. 123
Success of the Green and nationalism movements in the nuclear realm of
environmental protection may spill over into other areas of the defense
arena if the republics continue to gain more autonomy.
Each group I have mentioned has its own agenda and is set on pursuing
that agenda to its fullest. This has been the cause of much "polarization" and
"factionalism." 124 This factionalism and politicizing has the Foreign Ministry
very worried about ratification of the recently completed CFE treaty and the
future START treaty. Both treaties are to be submitted to several of these new
122Zubok.
123 D. J. Peterson, " Environmental Protection and the State of the Union," Radio
Liberty: Report On The USSR . 22 March 1991: 6-8.
124Zubok and Berezin.
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legislative Committees, and this concerns the Ministry a great deal. This
sounds very familiar to our own State Department. 125
The Republics may present the Soviets with a problem that we do not
have to encounter. Our States have no role in the treaty making process, nor
are they demanding one. However, the Soviet Republics, in their push for
autonomy and sovereignty, are broaching this subject. On one hand Boris
Yeltsin has said the Republics should have a voice in domestic affairs which
affect all the Republics. On the other hand he has indicated that he does not
want the republics to take over all union functions. 126
I think it is just a matter of time before the Republics attempt to exert
their influence in foreign affairs. Soviet scholars are also concerned about
this possibility. They see the Republics pushing for veto power over
important aspects of foreign and domestic policy. 127 In essence one Republic
out of fifteen could kill an arms control treaty for very parochial reasons. A
Republic may hold this power over the national government in order to get
its way on some unrelated issue.
Besides the full congress of People's Deputies wanting the right to vote
on treaty ratification they may assert their desire to be involved in many
stages of the treaty process. An obvious next stage for the Soviet Congress may
be their actual involvement in treaty ceremonies and negotiations.
Complications in the treaty process may force the Soviet executive branch to
125The CFE treaty will be submitted to the Soviet legislature in mid 1991 for
ratification. This follows the exchange of statements, by the 22 nations involved in CFE,
clarifying the "outstanding differences." "'Outstanding Differences' Removed in CFE
Talks," FBIS . 17 June 1991, 1.
126Maureen Dowd, "Bush Meets and Commends Yeltsin But Cites Support for
Gorbachev," New York Times . 21 June 1991, sec. A, p. 1.
127Berezin.
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resort to executive agreements between the Soviet government and foreign
governments. 128 In order to get around the complexities and problems
associated with treaty making the United States has used the term executive
agreement to justify some government-to-government agreements. They
have the same force as a treaty and are legally binding under international
law. Usually any international agreement not submitted to the Senate falls
into this category. This is an ambiguous definition utilized to avoid
"legislative scrutiny," thus avoiding the embarrassment of defeat and denial.
Just as with our relationship with Japan there are several factors which
will create problems in our relationship with a new Soviet democracy. A
liberal democracy is full of formal and informal groups who push and lobby
for their own agenda. In the Soviet Union these groups fall between the
breakaway Republics on the left and the hard-liners on the right. While
pursuing future arms control agreements U.S. planners must be aware of the
problems which will be presented by the Legislature, Military, KGB,
Republics, public opinion, and a variety of ancillary groups (Academia,
Greens, etc.).
2. Opportunities for the U.S.
Besides the problems presented by the eventual Soviet government
structure there are a great many opportunities as well. We have to learn to
take advantage of a more open and free Soviet society. No longer will policy
making be as cloaked in secrecy as it has been in the past. U.S. policy-makers
must be able to perceive openings created in the Soviet political landscape.
128 Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy . 414-415.
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As currents of positions ebb and flow it is important to pick and choose when
and how to pursue U.S. national security interests.
Decision-makers have to be able to take advantage of these opportunities
created by the Soviet Union in transition as well as when they finally reach a
stable democratic form of government. The time may be right for us to take
advantage of the opportunities created by all of the old and newly formed
interest groups in the Soviet Union. We may well want to play one or more
groups off one and other.
"...contemporary evidence suggests that current Soviet conditions may
be ripe for the exercise of this kind of fine-grained intervention through
the use of arms control and foreign economic policy."129
In doing so we can help ensure good arms control agreements will be reached,
and we quite possibly help further reform in the Soviet Union. One scholar
in analyzing these opportunities has written:
"First, the aims of U.S. policy should be to discredit militaristic and
party-ideological cartels and to strengthen Soviet institutions exerting
countervailing power against them. Promoting "democracy: in the Soviet
Union should be the U.S. goal only insofar as it serves those ends. Second,
this can be done by targeting U.S. behavior at discrediting the foreign
policy arguments of militaristic and expansionist groups and showing that
the international platform of the reformers is sound. Third, the United
States can also use arms-control and foreign-economic policy to promote
the growth of Soviet institutions that have a stake in a stable detente, the
knowledge to argue its benefits in Soviet councils, and the successful track
record to make those claims credible. Fourth, this strategy is worth
attempting even if the Gorbachev domestic reforms have only a modest
chance of success. Implementing this approach does not require making
unilateral concessions that would jeopardize Western security in the
event that Gorbachev failed. 130




It was interesting to discover that the Soviets already understand the
importance of conducting policy in such a manner. Recent research work has
outlined just how the Soviets study and use information about our political
system. 131 The Soviet reaction to the Senate debate and ratification to the
recent Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was indeed interesting.
"Soviet americanists, while largely sharing the view of most American
observers that the INF Treaty would ultimately be approved by the Senate,
were nonetheless uneasy about the length of the debate and the potential
of the opposition to frustrate and complicate Senate approval. Thus,
while amerikanistika [the Soviet study of American foreign policy for the
purpose of aiding the formulating of Soviet leadership policy decisions] on
the Senate debate was largely straight forward, apprehension was apparent
in the description of the slow process leading to eventual approval." 132
It is my belief that this type of political analysis, though already done
now to a certain extent, will become even more valuable in the future. This
will be the only manner in which we can make the critical decisions involved
in national security as the situation in the Soviet Union continues to evolve.
Democratic governments can take many form as I have shown by my
definition in Chapter II. In this chapter I have laid out the heart of my thesis
by analyzing a relationship with analogous negotiations, and by looking at
what the Soviets may do in the way of arms control in a democracy. It is my
hope that decision-makers will utilize these two comparisons in an attempt
to gain valuable insight into inter-democracy relations. In the next chapter, I
will look at where we should be going with future arms control agreements.
131 Robert T. Huber, Soviet Perceptions Of The U.S. Congress: The Impact on
Superpower Relations . (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.)
132 lbid., 170 and 171.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Having discussed the implications of a new form of Soviet government
on treaty negotiating and ratification it is important to understand the role of
arms control in U.S. strategy. In this chapter I will look at the present U.S.
approach to arms control with an eye on the future for U.S. policy-making. In
doing so, I will examine as well as the goals of U.S. arms control policy. In
addition, I will draw some conclusions as to where we should go with future
arms control initiatives.
A. U.S. APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL
The most logical place to begin in analyzing the U.S. approach to arms
control is the President's National Security Strategy. The President has
broken down his strategy into three (3) agendas— Political, Economic, and
Defense.
As with our definition of arms control the President has made arms
control part of the U.S. political agenda. It is important to understand his
agenda when looking at the future of arms control negotiations and
agreements. In the National Security Strategy he spells out where arms
control fits into U.S. policy and how decision-makers will evaluate arms
control agreements.
"Arms control is a means, not an end; it is an important component of
a broader policy to enhance national security. We will judge arms control
agreements according to several fundamental criteria:
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First, agreements must add to our security. Our objective
is to reduce the incentives, even in crisis, to initiate an attack.
Thus, we seek not reductions for reductions' sake, but
agreements that will promote stability. We will work to
reduce the capabilities most suited for offensive action or
preemptive strike.
Second, to enhance stability, we favor agreements that
lead to greater predictability in the size, nature, and evolution
of military forces. Predictability through openness expands
the traditional focus of arms control beyond just military
capabilities and addresses the fear of aggressive intent.
Third, agreements are effective only if we can verify
compliance. As we broaden our agenda to include issues like
chemical and missile proliferation, verification will become
an increasingly difficult challenge, but effective verification
will still be required. We want agreements that can endure.
Finally, since the security of the United States is
indivisible from that of its friends and allies, we will insist
that any arms control agreements not compromise allied
security." 133
This political agenda is designed to dovetail with the defense agenda.
Both work in concert with the economic agenda to form three legs to U.S.
policy. Arms control is but a part, an important one, but still just a part of
overall U.S. strategy. Joseph Nye has written:
"In the 1950s the early theorists of modern arms control aimed to
reduce the risk and damage of war and save resources. Since those goals
are not very different from the objectives of defense policy, it is natural for
defense and arms control measures to interact as complementary means to
the same ends, the management of international security in the future is
likely to require more, not less, attention to the political role of arms
control." 134
133George Bush, National Security Strategy Of The United States . (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1990), 15-16.
134Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control After The Cold War," Foreign Affairs .. Winter
1989/90: 42-64.
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B. U.S. ARMS CONTROL GOALS
Directly linked to the U.S. approach to arms control are U.S. arms control
goals. Goals can be viewed two ways. On one hand the direct goal of an arms
control agreement may be the constraint or reduction of certain weapons
systems or forces. On the other hand there may be spin-off or tertiary goals.
In the context of a direct goal in the near term the President will attend a
summit in Moscow to complete the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START). He and his advisors cleared the last hurdles blocking the
completion of the agreement in late July 1991. In the long term the President
has made a number of goals that are geared toward a variety of areas. They
include a START II agreement, Chemical Weapons ban, expansion of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an Open Skies regime, and a number of CSBM's. 135
Some will be pursued bilaterally with the Soviets and others will be sought
after in a multilateral forum.
Spin-off effects of arms Control agreements are hard to measure, but
undoubtedly they do occur. One of those spin-off effects is enhanced
superpower relations.
"Arms control, it was felt, might also have a beneficial impact upon
superpower relations generally, not just the military-strategic relationship.
If adversaries could develop the habit of mutually beneficial cooperation
in an area of their relations as fraught with tension as the strategic balance,
then this habit of cooperation might spill over into other areas. It might
then act as a catalyst for the solution of political problems." 136
135 Bush, National Security Strategy Of The United States . 16-17.
136Sheehan, Arms Control: Theory and Practice . 11-12.
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I would contend that this phenomena may be a two-way street. That is
to say that other political developments may affect arms control as much as
arms control influences them. In testifying before the House committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Director, Ronald Lehman may have recognized this when he said, "Arms
control helps manage the symptoms of tension; political reform helps reduce
the causes." 137
He was undoubtedly speaking of the political reform in the Soviet
Union. As I stated earlier we do not know where the path of political reform
will take the Soviets, but it is within our interest to facilitate them along the
way. How we aid them is a completely separate subject. However, as one
scholar has written arms control is certainly one part of our relationship with
the Soviet Union, and it may help facilitate them down the road of reform.
Therefore, what about the future with respect to arms control with the
Soviets.
In past treaty ratification the Presidium appeared to be nothing more
than a rubber stamp to any treaty signed by the General Secretary and
endorsed by the Politburo. This will definitely not be the case in the future.
The future is very uncertain and there is one analysis which summarizes it
very well.
"The emergence of a multiparty system in the USSR, with various
political groups pursuing different—and at times opposing
—
goals, is
coinciding with a period during which the central authorities are being
inconsistent in their implementations of democratic reforms.
Representatives of the new movements are often politically
137Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Status Of U.S. Arms Control Policy .
101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1, 14, and 21 March 1990, 11.
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inexperienced, and the CPSU is facing a serious crisis that may well result
in a split in its ranks. This makes the political situation highly
unpredictable." 138
The Soviets are currently in a state of "unbalanced equilibrium." 139
Total reform of the Soviet government may be a long way off, but there is a
need for U.S. planners to consider all possible options. I only presented four
possible outcomes to the transformation that is now taking place. A new
union treaty for the Soviet Republics will be necessary for any further
meaningful reform to take place. This treaty is a necessary hurdle that must
be cleared before a new national government constitution can be
implemented. There is no set timetable for any of this to occur, so it is wise
for U.S. analysts to be prudently cautious and optimistic. 140
Due to this uncertainty it may be best for U.S. decision-makers to
"hedge" their bets. A truism now is to make plans for the worst case scenario.
That is not to say we should balk at arms control treaty negotiations or not
commit to a sound arms control treaty. I am merely pointing out that we
must enter any negotiation or agreement with full cognizance of the domestic
Soviet environment.
"Behind both negotiations, [CFE and START], however, lurks
uncertainty about the future of Gorbachev and his reforms. Skeptics in
the Defense Department and elsewhere in the administration argue that
the United States should not let down its guard. They point to the
reversal of Khrushchev's reforms tow decades ago and warn that
Gorbachev's reforms are similarly reversible. They urge an attitude of
s
wait and see.' Others argue that the possibility of reversal makes it all the
138Tolz, "The Emergence of a Multiparty System in the USSR," 9.
139Berezin.
140Berezin believed a new union treaty would pass within a two month time frame of
December 1990, and that a new constitution will be adopted by mid-Summer 1991. It
now appears that these events will not happen until late 1991 early 1992.
75
more urgent to seize this opportunity to reach favorable agreements in an
approach that can be characterized as Mocking in gains.' On balance,
however, uncertainties about the permanence of the Gorbachev
phenomenon tend to slow progress in arms control."141
On the other hand it is quite possible that both the U.S. and Soviet Union will
be forced to make unilateral cuts for reasons other than arms control.
Economic constraints in both counties may cause each to evaluate military
expenditures on different merits.
Arms control treaties should be arranged when there exists mutual
benefit for both sides. They should not be used for political purposes, and we
should not make agreements for the sake of making agreements. Remember
that arms control does not have to be disarmament, but instead it can be any
type of reduction. Any agreement concluded must be in the United States'
national security interest and it has to be meaningful and verifiable. It is
important to remember the Soviets are still embarked upon a modernization
program for all of their strategic forces—ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, and air and
ballistic missile defense forces. 142 As I stated earlier there is no guarantee that
democracies will always get along. That very important security reason
looms ever larger in this light.
If governmental reform in the Soviet Union is successful then the
opportunity will exist to pursue meaningful arms control. It must be
remembered that any arms control agreement made will be subject to
verification and that it will be extremely difficult for the Soviets to break in a
141 Nye, "Arms Control After the Cold War," 51. This article was written prior to the
completion of CFE and START, but one can apply any negotiation that is ongoing into Nye's
first sentence. The principle remains the same.
142Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress . (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, January 1991), 51.
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major way. Additionally, any agreements made at a given time with a
government of a country carry over to any new government formed
subsequently. Therefore, the time may be right to lock the Soviet Union and
ourselves into arms control agreements that really do substantially reduce the
risk of war.
There is one serious misgiving connected with unilateral arms control
by either side without the benefit of negotiated treaty. With unilateral
reduction you only bring yourself down and you may not force or compel
your opponent to join you. To me that is the key. Formalized arms control
helps ensure both sides reduce their forces.
"The alternative to some form of negotiated arms control is, in fact,
uncoordinated force cuts and unilaterally determined modernization
programs—the two sides of the restructuring coin. Obviously, such
restructuring will not yield automatic improvements in stability. Worse
still, the results of haphazard cuts could be a military relationship between
the major powers that is even less stable than the one that exists
today....Arms-control-without-agreements is even more vulnerable to
changing circumstances than arms control registered in a formal treaty
because there are no formal laws or treaty obligations to restrain
governments. 143
With this in mind, leaders must look for the right conditions to be in
place before embarking after agreements that are too ambitious.
"Policy makers recognize there is no guarantee that an arms-control
agreement will secure the advice and consent of the Senate (or the Soviet
legislature [my interjection]), no matter how well conceived and
negotiated. The factors that determine the outcome of the ratification
process are many, diverse, and may be unrelated to the agreement. They
also are often beyond policymakers' control. ..(they include):
143James E. Goodby, "Can Arms Control Survive Peace?," The Washington Quarterly .
Autumn 1990: 93-104.
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= Tenor of the times;
= Public perception of an agreement's scope and effectiveness;
= International developments;
= Congressional dynamics (Soviet Legislate dynamics [my addition]);
and
= Executive branch cohesion. 144
These will all come into play in future arms control agreements between
the U.S. and Soviet Union. Careful observation and analysis is crucial for
both sides' policy-makers. What has been said about the U.S. in the past
concerning arms control may be able to be said about the new Soviet Union.
The inherent idiosyncrasies of a democratic government will be in evidence
on both sides.
Future arms control treaties between the U.S. and USSR may become
more difficult rather than easier because of these factors. Some may argue
that even with these factors arms control may no longer be necessary between
two cooperating democratically based governments. On the other hand, arms
control may come more natural as a by-product of democracy. I have proven
that both of these are difficult propositions to subscribe to when dealing with
another democracy that will have the military potential of the Soviet Union.
In approaching those issues it is important to remember another part of
the ACDA Director's testimony.
"A defense policy of deterrence and arms control agreements are
complementary means to the common purpose of reducing the risk of
war. The principal goals of all our arms control efforts are to reduce the
risk of war- nuclear or conventional- deter aggression, and increase
stability at lower levels of armed forces." 145
144 Paula L. Scalingi, "Ratifying Arms-Control Agreements," The Washington Quarterly .
Spring 1991: 109-124.
145Congress, House, Status Of U.S. Arms Control Policy .
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It is my hope that I have brought to the surface of policy and decision-
making a very important topic. There remains a significant amount of
analysis and research required in this field. Many unanswered questions
persist, and their answers will have a direct influence on U.S. national
security planning. Both the U.S. and Soviets may approach negotiations for
arms control differently if they perceive negotiation and ratification problems
on their own or their counterpart's home front. The Soviets are learning first
hand that domestic factors are inextricably linked to foreign policy.
There is a definite paradox associated with the future. The Soviets may
finally conform to the system of government we have advocated for so long;
and in doing so they may jeopardize mutually beneficial arms control treaties
with complicated or unattainable negotiation and ratification requirements.
Ironically our own democratic form of government may be the best system
for individual rights and at the same time the root of future nation-state
interaction problems.
An additional irony is that for a great many years we have strived for the
demise of the Soviet Union as a communist state, and now we may find that
it is more difficult to effectively deal with them on many important issues.
At present, we are now more concerned with stability in the Soviet Union
vice unfettered reform. That does not mean we do not seek reform at a rapid
pace, but it does imply we are concerned about chaos and instability that
would be created if reform was to occur unabated.
Should the Soviet Union successfully transform itself into a democracy
of some sort, and it is my hope and belief that they will, it will indeed be
interesting to observe how they manage representative politics. Seventy plus
79
years of communism certainly taught them how to run bureaucracies, maybe
they will be better at it than the U.S. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are
both adept at playing western politics and utilizing public opinion for their
own benefit. We must not not be unprepared for own game.
This thesis has proven that arms control is still necessary with a
democratic Soviet Union, and that it may become more difficult rather than
easier. The achievement of solid agreements will require the U.S. to consider
all of the aspects involved in the Soviet political process. Each chapter of this
thesis built this argument by ensuring the reader understands as much as
possible about arms control with the new Soviet Union. Undoubtedly a great
many issues remain, but it was my desire to stimulate U.S. decision-makers
thought processes with regards to these issues.
"Arms control will never provide all the answers to national security.
In some cases, it might even do more harm than good. In all cases, it will
have to be integrated with other dimensions of policy and other policy
instruments. But the changing nature of world politics suggests both new
roles and new importance for arms control. If an arms control process did
not exist, we would assuredly have to invent it."146


































































































< t / CO









































































































































































































































Congress of People's Deputies (CPD)
2250 members elected by popular vote every 5 years: 750 from population-based electoral districts;
750 from administrative districts; 750 from national public organizations. The CPD elects the
Supreme Soviet and its Chairman, and approves the state plan and budget and constitutional
amendements
USSR Supreme Soviet
542 members elected from the CPD by secret ballot. Divided into two Councils scheduled to meet
in the spring and fall for sessions of 3-4 months. Supreme Soviet enacts legislation, approves top
government appointments, helps prepare state economic plan, ratifies treaties, approves declaration
of internal emergency situations, authorizes use of armed forces abroad , declares war. Up to
one-fifth of members can be replaced annually.
Presidium Of The Supreme Soviet
Composed of the Supreme Soviet leadership (Chairman, chairman and deputy chairman of both Councils;
committee/commission chairman; representatives from each territorial/administrative unit). Prepares agenda
and organizes work ofCPD & Supreme Soviet, coordinates commissions and committees, and organizes
nationwide discussion of USSR draft laws.
Council of the Union
Chairman, 271 members based on equal
population districts. Responsible for
national issues: economy, legal rights,





-Labor, Prices, & Social Policy




Chairman, 271 members based on administrative regions.
Responsible for federal & interethnic issues.
Commissions
-Afghanistan War Veterans Affairs
-Consumer GoodsjTrade, & Municpal,
Consumer, & Other Services
-Culture, Language, Nat'l &C Int'l Traditions, &
Protection of Historical Heritage
-Nationalities Policy & Interethnic Relations
-Social &C Economic Development of Union &
Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, & Okrugs
Joint Committees Of The USSR Supreme Soviet
Responsible for oversight of ministries, initial confirmation of top appointments. Half of the
members arc drawn from the Supreme Soviet, half from other CPD members.
Law & Order and Battle Against Crime
Agrarian & Food
Construction & Architecture
Defense & State Security
Ecology & the Rational Use of Natural Resources




Science, Education, Culture & Upbringing
Soviet of People's Deputies & Management
& Self-management Development
Veteran &C Invalid Affairs
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